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THE 1989 U.S.-ROC (TAIWAN) FISHERIES NEGOTIATIONS

by Mark Mon-Chang Hsieh*
Introduction
The sea is the source and the provider of life. Life evolved from
the sea and lived off the sea. Mankind fishes from the sea, sails on the
sea, and mines from the sea. Seventy percent of the Earth's surface is
covered by water. Eighty percent of the Earth's animal life lives in the
sea. 1 Of the 163 nation-states in the world, 118 of them have some
kind of a coastline. Before the twentieth century, nations viewed the
sea as a global common with inexhaustible resources. The 17th century Dutch jurist Hugo Grotius in his work, Mare Liberum (Freedom
of the Sea), captured this belief. Grotius, dubbed the father of international law declared in his work that the air and ocean, made by Nature, are res nullius (belonged to no one) or res communis (belonged to
everyone), and ought to be as they were made, free. 2 Moreover, for
Grotius, the oceans are "forever bountiful and forever inexhaustible."
Thus, man can use the sea and its resources at his will.
Since Grotius, however, the status of the sea has changed. With
increased global interdependence and advances in transportation,
questions concerning territorial seas and the freedom of navigation
have become topics of debate. With technological advances in fishing
and discoveries of mineral deposits in seabeds, the global community
has become increasingly anxious over the unregulated use of the sea.
The Third United Nations Conference on the Law of the Sea began in
1973 and specifically tried to resolve these problems within a legal
context. After countless meetings and compromises, the Conference
finally adopted, in 1982, the United Nations Convention on the Law of
the Sea (LOS Convention)- which as of 1985, 159 nations had al• In 1989, Mr. Hsieh undertook this study as his undergraduate honors project at
Wesleyan University ( Middletown, CT). Professor Guilio Gallarotti of Wesleyan Univer·
sity supervised Mr. Hsieh's research. With a B.A. in Government, Mr. Hsieh is presently
persuing a two year M.I.A. (Master of International Affairs) at Columbia University
School of International and Public Affairs in New York.
1. David L. Larson, Major Issues of the Law of the Sea, Durham, New Hampshire:
The University of New Hampshire, 1976, p. 1.
2. Hamilton Vreeland, Hugo Grotius, New York: Oxford University Press, 1917, p.
55.
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ready signed. 3 The law deviated drastically from Grotius's views. In
term of resources, this LOS Convention was adopted on the premise
that the marine resources are exhaustible and the sea, if over exploited,
may not always be bountiful. Grotius believed that the sea belonged
to no one. The LOS Convention however permitted the allocation of
thirty-six percent. 4 of the sea as Exclusive Economic Zones (EEZ) to
the coastal nations. The LOS Convention reduced the marine global
common by carving the sea into private pieces for individual nations.
The sea is no longer free, and as a result, disputes over resource allocation has increased over the years.
Fishery issues took the center stage during the drafting of the
LOS Convention. Due to conflicting interests, however, the resulting
articles in LOS Convention regarding marine resources were ambiguous. The law, for instance, stated in Article 87 the freedom to fish on
the high seas (international waters). Yet, in Article 66, it disallowed
non-origin nations from harvesting anadromous fish, which can be
found in the high seas. Aware of the weaknesses of the law, the drafters advocated cooperative efforts among all resource-users in utilizing
and conserving the available resources. It requested that the coastal
nations allocate the resources, which it alone can not fully-utilize, to
other countries. 5
The idealism of the LOS Convention has not reduced the
problems in the ocean fisheries. Despite the LOS Convention's promotion for cooperation among nations, most nations are only concerned with their individual benefits. For them, preservation of
resources for domestic use greatly overshadowed any schemes of resource allocation to others. To further aggravate the situation, with
more efficient fishing techniques, the ocean resources are being depleted rapidly. A pur seiner vessel fishing for tuna, for instance, can
catch up to 350 metric tons of fish in just one net set. 6 The combination of dwindling resources and the "privatization" of the global common has forced nations to compete aggressively in various ocean
fisheries. This unregulated competition has in tum, created numerous
international fishery disputes over the years.
3. Henry W. Degenhardt, Maritime Affairs A World Handbook, Detroit: The Gale
Research Company, 1985, p. 4.
4. David L. Larson, Major Issues of the Law of the Sea, supra, note 1, p.l.
5. Hsieh Ta-wen, Hai-yang hsin chih-hsu yu kuo-chi yu-ye kuan-hsi (The New Sea
Order and International Fishery Management), Kaohsiung, Taiwan: Conference on "From
International Law of the Seas to the North Pacific Salmon Problem." pp. 48-50.
6. Luther L. Carter, "Law of the Sea: Fisheries Plight Poses Dilemma for the United
States, "Science, No. 185, (July 26, 1974), p. 338.
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In 1989, one of the major fishing issues in the United States was
the use of driftnets in the high seas of the Pacific Ocean. Environmentalists argued that the nets were "stripmining" the ocean. The salmon
industry, on the other hand, claimed that the nets were used to poach
North American salmon. The United States, concerned with the use
of this technology, entered into a series of negotiations with the
driftnet nations of Japan, South Korea, and the ROC on Taiwan. The
goal of these negotiations was to establish agreements with these nations in regulating their driftnet fleets and to prevent further interception of North American salmon. After six months of consultations, on
August 26, 1989, the ROC on Taiwan's Coordination Council for
North American Affairs (CCNAA) reluctantly signed a fishery agreement with the United States' American Institute in Taiwan (AIT). 7
The agreement was far from cooperative. It placed numerous responsibilities on the ROC on Taiwan and further restricted her fishery operations in the North Pacific. The ROC on gave in to virtually every U.S.
demand and, as a result, the ROC government came under severe criticism at home. A study of the negotiation uncovered that in the
United States, the various lobbying forces contributed to the
adamancy of the U.S. negotiation stand. As for the ROC, her capitulation in this fishery talks was mainly the result of her dependency on
the United States as an ally and trade partner. In addition, the ROC
on Taiwan's insecurity over her diplomatic isolation and domestic
pressure posed further disadvantages in her negotiations. Finally, the
lack of coordination among the ROC government agencies, and with
the domestic fishing industry prevented her from negotiating effectively with the thoroughly prepared United States.
The first section of this study presents the background information on the negotiation. It conveys briefly the history of fishery relations between the ROC and the United States. It then proceeds to
describe the salmon habitat and harvesting conditions, and documents, in some detail, the poaching problem in the North Pacific.
Lastly, the section looks at the driftnet technology, the development of
the North Pacific driftnet fishery, and the dire consequences of
driftnetting.
Following the background information, section two synthesizes
and analyzes the dynamics of the driftnet/salmon issue in the United
States. It looks specifically at the rise of the environmental movement
7. Chiu Hungdah," The Legal Status of the Republic of China," in Hungdah Chiu,
ed., Chinese Yearbook of International Law and Affairs, Vol. 8 ( 1988-1989), Baltimore,
Maryland: Chinese Society of International Law, p. 1.
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in America, the economic importance of the salmon industry, the U.S.
overall negotiation strategy to use the ROC on Taiwan as a precedent,
and the efforts of the anti-driftnet lobby. The section concludes that of
all the factors, the lobbying forces appeared to have the most impact in
shaping the U.S. negotiating stand and in maintaining the publicity
over the issue.
In understanding the U.S. position on the driftnet/salmon issue,
the study turns now to the ROC side of the negotiation. Section three
summarizes the main points of the 1989 fishing agreement and illustrates the negative impact it has on the ROC. After highlighting the
weaknesses of the 1989 agreement, the section asks the question," how
could the ROC have negotiated a more favorable agreement?" It then
speculates possible strategies and compromises the ROC on Taiwan
could have used in these negotiations. The proposals includes jointventures, an international fishery management regime, a global
driftnet conference, joint-negotiation with Japan, joint monitorship,
and cooperative training programs.
Section four of this study asks why the ROC did not try harder in
the negotiation. Why did she fail to explore other options with the
United States? The dismal result of the negotiation suggests a constrained ROC negotiation team. The section probes the factors which
influenced the ROC's negotiating stands, and how these factors restricted the negotiators' options. Some of these factors are the dependency of the ROC on the United States, ROC's insecurity over her
diplomatic isolation, domestic pressure on the sovereignty issue,
ROC's concern over her international image and the absence of a reasonable and coherent negotiation strategy.
The ROC on Taiwan failed in this round of negotiation. In fact,
the ROC on Taiwan, despite her increased economic strength, is still
confronting difficulties in international negotiations. Section five investigates the possibility of track two diplomacy. The section first describes what track two entails and looks at how ROC's flourishing
private sector could perform track two diplomacy for the government.
Section five then speculates on how track two diplomacy might have
bettered the outcome of the 1989 fishery negotiation.
This study concentrates on the U.S. domestic politics and the
ROC's foreign policymaking. The author looks at how domestic lobbying and the constituent- conscious Congress in the United States can
drastically alter governmental negotiation strategies and aims. The
study then, looks at the U.S.- ROC negotiation in the context of a
strong-weak country negotiation and sifts out the major constraints on
the ROC in such situation. Despite the ROC's inferiority, the author
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explores the options that the ROC has or can develop in order to negotiate more effectively even under such adverse conditions.
Section 1: Salmon Poaching and Driftnet Fishing
The United States and the ROC have long nurtured a close
friendship. Even after its de jure recognition of the Beijing government
as the sole representation of China, the United States has continued to
treat Taiwan, formerly recognized by the United States as the Republic of China, as an independent state through the Taiwan Relations
Act. In the absence of official diplomatic ties, the United States and
the ROC respectively established the American Institute in Taiwan
(AIT) and the Coordinating Council for North American Affairs
(CCNAA). 8 These institutions have performed as de facto diplomatic
missions and have provided the forum for discussion and exchange.
Despite the two countries' close ties, conflicting interests in the last
few years have strained the their normally congenial relationship. The
long-standing dispute over fishing between the ROC on Taiwan and
the United States resulted in the 1989 AIT-CCNAA Fisheries Negotiations. On the ROC side, the negotiations provided significant insights into her foreign policymaking. On the American side, the
negotiations exemplified the prowess of effective lobbying.
The ROC values her fishery industries. In addition to a strong
domestic demand for fish, the ROC also exported $1.68 billion worth
of fishery products in 1988. The ROC's fishing vessels have operated
for years in distant ocean fisheries around the world in order to meet
these demands. A substantial portion of ROC's vessels have operated
either within the U.S. Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ) or near the
U.S. coastal waters. In response to these fisheries operations, the two
countries have, since the mid-1970's, twice signed treaties and in the
process, have carried out numerous consultations. While the 1989
AIT-CCNAA Fishing Agreement was not the first bilateral fishing accord between the two countries, it was the first one to specifically target the use of driftnets and the interception of the North American
salmon. In 1977, when the ROC was still recognized as the Republic
of China, the two countries signed the Governing International Fishery Agreement (GIFA). 9 At that time the United States also negotiated a series of similar GIFA's with the other countries whose fishing
8. Republic of China: A Reference Book, Taipei: Government Information Office, Republic of China, May 1983, p. 293.
9. Rozanne L. Ridgway, Deputy Assistant Secretary for Oceans and Fisheries Affairs,
"Department Reviews Developments in International Fisheries Policy," Department of
State Bulletin, Vol. 76, (February 28, 1977), pp. 175-177.
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vessels operated in the American 200-mile EEZ. These GIFA's reflected an American effort, in accordance with the Magnuson Fishery
Conservation and Management Act of 1976 (MFCMA), to 'Americanize' her fisheries. 10 These agreements essentially gave the United
States complete jurisdiction over her EEZ, and allowed her to manage
and self-utilize her fisheries resources. In 1982 the two countries, now
represented by AIT and CCNAA, signed another similar fisheries
agreement. In this agreement, however, the Americans specifically requested the cooperation of CCNAA to assist U.S. enforcement officials
to board and to inspect ROC vessels. Although the 1982 AITCCNAA Fishery Agreement expired in 1987, the two countries
agreed to abide by the agreement until another fishing agreement was
ratified 11 •
The restrictions placed on foreign fishing in the American EEZ
through the MFCMA, forced the ROC to seek alternative fishing
grounds in international waters, or sometimes called, the high seas.
While the 1982 fishery agreement was still in effect, the development
of a ROC high sea squid fleet of 146 vessels in the North Pacific raised
much American anxiety (see map A). After receiving reports that the
ROC fleet had been poaching salmon on the high seas, the United
States asked the ROC authorities to regulate their own fleet in the
North Pacific. The request resulted in the "ROC North Pacific Squid
Fleet Operational Regulations," which forbade any ROC fisherman
from harvesting salmon. 12 Because salmon and squid resided in different water temperatures, this operational regulation established seasonal restrictions according to the seasonal water temperature in the
North Pacific. These boundaries in effect separated the squid fishery
from the salmon migration path, thus, decreasing the rate of salmon
bycatches (see map B). In 1983, the ROC government also placed a
ban on the export of salmon. This ban was followed soon after by a
Japanese ban on imports of salmon from the ROC. Strong U.S. diplomatic pressure had forced the ROC to legislate these domestic regulations to deter both the fishermen and the entire industry from profiting
in salmon piracy. During the 1989 fishery negotiations, the ROC vessels were thus still required to abide by the 1982 bilateral agreement,
10. Edward E. Wolf, "U.S. Responsibilities in International Fisheries Matters," Department of State Bulletin, Vol. 89, (July 1989), p. 56.
11. Phone interview with Professor Fu kuen-chen, National Taiwan University, August 20, 1989.
12. Kuo Tsung-hai, Wuo-kuo kung-hai liou-wan yu-ye kuan-li chi tan- t'ou (A Study of
the Nation's Management of its High Sea Driftnet Industry), Taipei: Fisheries Section,
Council of Agriculture. p. 2.
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the domestic North Pacific operational regulations, and the salmon
export bans.
The 1989 AIT-CCNAA fisheries negotiations were carried out
pursuant to the Driftnet Impact, Monitoring, Assessment and Control
Act of 1987 (The Driftnet Act)Y This act required the Secretary of
Commerce, with the assistance of the Secretary of State, to negotiate
cooperative agreements with those countries which maintain high seas
driftnet fisheries that take U.S. marine resources in the North Pacific
Ocean. The focus of the negotiations came to rest upon two major
issues: the high sea interception of salmon and the use of driftnets.
Although these two issues are clearly related, for the purpose of clarity, each issue is discussed separately.
Salmon Poaching
Though only one of the many species of fish found on the high
seas, salmon is politically controversial because of its unique life cycle.
Salmon is high in monetary value and has a unique migratory lifestyle.
Throughout its life cycle, a salmon crosses over and back national
boundaries, moves among territorial waters, and may travel thousands
of miles from its birthplace. This lifecycle begins with the deposition
and fertilization of eggs in a freshwater river or stream. After birth, a
six-inch 'smolt' eventually swims out into the ocean, where it will
spend the rest of its life until time of reproduction. At such time, the
fish returns to its home stream or river, reproduces, and then dies.
The ability of salmon to adjust to both salt and fresh water and its
ability to find the home river are still mysteries. However, the
salmon's changing habitat has made the ownership of this fish extremely controversial. Some countries have argued that because
salmon spends most of their lifecycles in the ocean, they should be
considered public goods available to all states. A different set of countries, consisting of states where salmon are spawned rejected that argument. They responded instead that salmon should be considered
private goods from where they originated. The salmon habitat
strained the concept of the global common and made the ownership
question a continual problem. 14
There are salmon in both the Atlantic Ocean and the Pacific
13. "Report of the Secretary of Commerce to the Congress of the United States on the
Nature, Extend and Effects of Driftnet Fishing in the Water of the North Pacific Ocean
Persuant to Section 4005 of Public Law 100-200, the Driftnet Impact, Monitoring, Assess·
ment and Control Act", Washington D.C.: U.S. Department of Commerce, 1988.
14. Daniel Jack Chasan, "Salmon, Bitter Fruit of Pacific," Audobon, Vol. 77, (November 1975), pp. 8-11.
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Ocean. Nevertheless, the Pacific Ocean produces over ninety percent
of the overall catch. Pacific salmon, are subdivided between those
which origined in Asia and those from North American. Xn North
America the salmon habitat ranges on the west coast from northern
California to the Arctic Circle and as far inland as the mountains of
Idaho. In the ocean, salmon are found in water temperatures ranging
between one and fifteen degree Celsius, with the heaviest concentration in the two to twelve degree range. There are six species of Pacific
salmon, each with a different population, distribution, life cycle, migration path, and appearance (see Appendix 1). The pink salmon, the
most abundant of all Pacific salmon, are found from northern California to the Aleutian Islands. They are unique in that they mature after
spending two summers and one winter in the ocean, resulting in yearly
variable populations. The Chum salmon, the second most abundant,
are found from northern California to the Mackenzie River in Canada.
The Sockeye salmon, the most valuable of all the Pacific salmon, are
found from Northern California to Point Hope, Alaska. The Chinook
salmon, the largest, yet least abundant, of all Pacific salmon, are found
from central California to Northwest Alaska and have the longest migration path up to 3000 miles. The last two types of salmon are the
Coho and the Masou. Cohos are found from Northern California to
Northwest Alaska. Masous, on the other hand, are only found in Japanese waters. The numerical distribution of these salmon in the Eastern Pacific region are as follow: Pink 48 percent, Sockeye 25 percent,
Chum 12 percent, Coho 10 percent, and Chinook 5 percent. The
ocean-bound salmon are found northwest of 40 degrees North and 135
degrees West, an area 3000 miles in length and 1000 miles in width. 15
The salmon's habitat made the management and harvest of this
fish extremely controversial. Should the fish be treated as a common
good like the other fish in the ocean or should those countries in
which salmon origined have sole ownership of the fish. In the Pacific,
four countries, Canada, Japan, the United States and the Soviet
Union, constitute these salmon-origin countries. However, Japan harvests not only Asian salmon, but also North American salmon. This
issue thus sparked a North American effort at the Third United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea, to regain control of its salmon
stocks. At the Law of the Sea Caracas session, the U.S. delegation
circulated a booklet, which stated " Pacific salmon supports a larger
number of fishermen, vessels and boats and canneries than any other
15. Report of Secretary of Commerce, supra , note 12, pp. 51-59.
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North American fishery." 16 Then, in the 1974 UN Law of the Sea
Conference plenary session, Canada published a report arguing that
salmon is the only species of marine fish that can be effectively hatched
and managed, and therefore, that the salmon-origin state is the only
agent capable of such responsibility. 17 The report is substantiated on
the fact that salmon always return to the home stream at the end of
their life cycle. This predictability permits not only an accurate count
in fish population, but also allows concentrated management/hatchery
efforts. The lobbying efforts of these two countries resulted in the Article 66 of the LOS Convention, which gave to the country of origin
the sole right and the responsibility to manage and conserve its respective anadromous species of fish. Article 66, in effect, made salmon a
private good, available to only the country of origin.
To reinforce the UN proclamation, the Pacific salmon-origin
countries established another international regime to manage the harvests of Pacific salmon. In 1951, the United States, Canada, and Japan, founded the International North Pacific Fisheries Commission
(INPFC) in order to better the salmon stock in the Northern Pacific. 18
Since then, the Commission has gathered annually to discuss the catch
sizes and fisheries problems, and to exchange information on the fish.
The Soviet Union, though not a member of INPFC, has also negotiated separate bilateral agreements with the three countries. Through
INPFC and the bilateral agreements, these four countries have reserved to themselves the exclusive right to harvest salmon. As of
1987, the allocation of catches of these four countries are as follows:
United States, 46.2 percent; Japan, 26.4 percent; U.S.SR, 15.3 percent;
and Canada, 12.1 percent. 19 The United States is by far the largest
salmon harvester, and three species of salmon, Pink, Chum and Sockeye are the most crucial commerical stocks.
Neither the INPFC nor Article 66 could deter salmon poaching.
In both 1987 and 1988, salmon runs in southwest Alaska failed to
meet the forecasted returns. For example, in 1988, the fishermen
found only 5 million, out of the expected 42 million Sockeyes. 20
16. Chasan, Salmon, "Bitter Fruit of Pacific," supra, note 13, p. 8.
17. Albert W. Koers "Fishery Proposals in the United Nations Seabed Committee: An
Evaluation," Journal of Maritime Law and Commerce, Vol. 5, No.3, pp. 184-185.
18. Chasan, Salmon, "Bitter Fruit of Pacific", supra , note 13, p. 20.
19. Tsai Chien-ta, Kue-yu tsong lei chi sheng-chan kai-kuang (Salmon Variations and
Harvest Situation) Kaohsiung, Taiwan:Conference on "From International Law of Sea to
the North Pacific Salmon Problem" August 29, 1989, p. 89.
20. "Chi-Yang No. 1, High Seas Fishing and the US-Taiwan Fishing Negotiation"
Chung-hwa yu-ye (China Fisheries Weekly,) June 5, 1989, section 4, p.l.
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Although some experts have attributed this decline to the unpredictability of the ocean environment and to resulting possible changes in
the salmon life cycle, most fishermen and fishery specialists blamed the
decline on the high sea squid fisheries of Japan, South Korea, and the
ROC. These three fisheries, consisting of approximately 1,400 vessels,
fished an area equivalent to the size of the continental U.S. in the
North Pacific. The majority of these vessels operate with driftnets,
which though effective, are not selective in their catches. Although
the target catch is flying squid, other catches - such as tuna, dolphin,
or salmon may also be brought on board. The U.S. fishermen suspect
that these Asian fisheries, situated just south of the salmon migration
path, are in position to intercept salmon on their way back to the
home streams. Confirming the American fishermen's fears, there was
a sudden salmon glut on the European and Asian market in both 1987
and 1988. 21 Many of the salmon found on these markets were immature and 'bright' in appearance - meaning that these salmon were
harvested on the high seas at a point well before they had undergone
the physical changes22 associated with their returning to the rivers of
origin to spawn. 23 In addition, the fishermen found of the harvested
salmon, many with gillnet scars. Because the squid fishery is the only
driftnet fishery in the area, the U.S. fishermen deduced that the squid
driftnet fisheries had intercepted North American salmon. The three
countries suspected of poaching were Japan, South Korea, and the
ROC. Neither the ROC nor South Korea had the right to harvest
salmon. Japan, although permitted to catch salmon, had previously
also agreed to restrict its squid fleet from harvesting salmon.
Although the U.S. suspects all three countries of poaching North
American salmon, she found the most evidence against the ROC. The
ROC poachers are not simple fishermen selling the occasional bycatch
of salmon. Rather, the ROC violators have carried out meticulous
strategies of contracting, marketing, and exporting the intercepted
salmon. According to reliable Japanese sources, there has been around
110 ROC vessels targeting specifically salmon. In effect, the poachers
have established well-planned international salmon smuggling- rings.
As early as 1986, officers of the U.S. National Marine Fishery Service
(NMFS) seized 595,000 pounds of salmon alleged to have been caught
21. Pacific Seafood Processors Association,"Illegal High Seas Salmon Interception, Review and Action Plan," Seattle, February 23, 1989, Exhibition 12, p. l.
22. When salmon reache maturity and return to its river of origin, their appearances
will turn to a pinkish to red hue, depending on the salmon type. Immature salmon, in
contrast, are silver in color.
23. "Illegal High Seas Salmon Interception," supra, note 21, exhibition 1, p. 5.
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on the high seas by the ROC squid vessels. In June, 1988, NMFS
agents again uncovered a complex international scheme to import
ROC-caught salmon (This time 3 million pounds) to Japan via the
United States. On January 29, 1989, the service concluded a 2 year
"sting operation" and arrested two individuals who tried to smuggle
salmon from the ROC. More recently, on July 18, 1989, NMFS and
the U.S. Coast Guard arrested a ROC national, Patrick Lee, who offered undercover agents 2,500 metric tons of salmon. This more recent arrest involved a dramatic three day, six hundred mile chase
across the Pacific Ocean as the U.S. Coast Guard cutter "Morganthau" pursued two alleged ROC poaching vessels. These ships, the
"Ta Fong No 11" and the "Song-Ching No 12", were scheduled to
deliver the pirated salmon to the 'buyers' on the high seas. 24
In addition to uncovering these smuggling operations, in 1989 the
U.S. Coast Guard found much more evidence confirming Taiwanese
salmon poaching. In February 1989, the U.S. Coast Guards came
upon an abandoned ROC "ghostship," the "Chi-Sheng." The ship
contained a cargoload of rotting salmon. In April 1989, the Coast
Guards detained the ROC vessel, "Chi-Yang No 1", on the basis of
illegal fishing in the restricted zone and discovered traces of salmon on
board. Finally, on June 9, 1989, the Coast Guard cutter "Midget"
found the ROC vessel "Ta Chie No. 3" in the restricted zone. During
the time the U.S. officials requested the permission from the ROC Foreign Ministry to board "Ta Chie No. 3," NMFS agents in a Coast
Guard helicopter, photographed the ROC crew throwing trays of
salmon into the sea. 2 s
The ROC government claimed that these fishermen were the
"few" bad apples in the basket. However, the evidence placed her at a
great disadvantage when negotiating the 1989 fishing agreement in
which the problem of salmon poaching was one of the major concerns.
The other separate concern was the use of driftnets on the high seas.
Although the salmon poaching was due, in part, to the non-selectivity
of driftnets, the impact of the driftnet operation on the North Pacific
environment was itself a major issue at the negotiations.
Driftnetting
Pelagic driftnetting has been in use since the beginning of the cen24. ''The Battle of the Salmon, From Land to Sea," Chung-kuo shih-pao (China
Times) July 19, 1989, p. 1.

25. "U.S. Brings Down Hammer on Taiwan 'Squid' Fleet," National Fisherman, (September 1989), pp. 14-15.
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tury. The UN, in fact, has advocated the use of this technology to
assist underdeveloped countries in increasing their fishery harvests.
This traditional accepted form of driftnetting, however, is far smaller
in scale than its 1980's counterpart in the Pacific Ocean. The unregulated driftnetting in the Pacific Ocean has made the technology environmentally destructive. 26
Driftnets are plastic monofilamented gillnets used in the high sea
squid fisheries of the North Pacific. The nets are composed of panels
("tans") of approximately fifty meters long and seven meters deep.
Floats are attached on top of the net and weights are placed at the
bottom of the individual tans. The floats and the weights are used to
adjust the depth and the elasticity of the net (see Appendix 2). The
mesh size of the net ranges from eighty mmimeters to two hundred
and twenty millimeters. However, in the squid fisheries, the mesh size
are uniformly small, ranging from 80 millimeter to 120 miJJimeter. At
dusk, these nets are released at a right angle to the swimming path of
the fish. Fish are thus enmeshed or entangled by the nets. After setting, these plastic nets are allowed to drift with the current, hence the
name, driftnet. During each net-set, around 1000 tans are released
into the ocean, measuring up to fifty kilometers in length. With close
to 1,400 driftnet vessels in the North Pacific, around 32,000 kilometers
of these nets are stretched across the ocean every night. Annually,
these vessels release almost 1.6 million kilometers of driftnets in the
North Pacific (see map C)-27
The non-selectivity of the driftnet has caused it to be nicknamed
"the wall of death" (see Appendix 3). The net entangles many marine
animals other than squid, because these plastic nets are almost invisible to marine animals and because of its small mesh sizes. In the most
recent YAP Experiment aboard a Japanese fishing vessels belonging to
the YAP Venture Company, for instance, the crew released 15 kilometers of driftnets for 22 nights. Although the net's target catch was
Albacore, it also caught and killed 10 sea turtles, one grey whale, 10
small whales, and 97 dolphins. In addition, Greenpeace estimates that
the North Pacific driftnet operations killed approximately 800,000
26. Interview with Tung Ih Hsu, Senior specialist, The Institute of Fishery Biology,
The National Taiwan University, Taipei, Taiwan, August 29, 1989. The Institute, located
on the National Taiwan University campus, is largely funded by the Council of
Agriculture.
27. "High Seas Driftnets", Greenpeace Pacific Campaign, Auckland ,New Zealand,
1989, p. 3.
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birds annually. 28
Excessive bycatches of non-target species are not the only problem. Moreover, the conservationists have argued that this technique is
extremely wasteful. As the net is retrieved, around forty one percent
of the catch falls out of the net and around sixteen percent of the retrieved catches are considered unmarketable "trash catch" due to net
scars. Another problem with the net is that discarded nylon nets often
do not degrade and this will continue to catch marine lifes long after
the completion of the commercial undertakings. Greenpeace estimates around six hundred miles of these "ghostnets" are lost every
year in the North Pacific fisheries. 29
Considering the wastefulness of these driftnets why then do fleets
continue their driftnet operations? In truth, driftnet fishing is extremely efficient. Despite the losses, resulting catches compared to
other fishing techniques are still phenomenal. The Asian high sea
driftnet fishery flourished mainly in response to four major events in
the late 1970's:
1) The increase in fuel prices during the 1970's decreased the
economic efficiency of using competing fishing techniques, such as
jigging;
2) Coastal nations of the world extended exclusive economic
zones (EEZ) to 200 miles offshore, forcing many distant-water fleets to
develop new fisheries on the high seas;
3) Falling tuna prices in the late 1970's stimulated tuna longline
vessels to explore other fishing opportunities; and
4) Efforts of the MFCMA and the decreased salmon quota allowed Japan to reduce the number of salmon available to the Japanese
salmon driftnet fleet. As an ironic result, these driftnet vessels, many
idled, were forced into the squid fishery. 30
Driftnet fishing is a logical management decision to reap immediate profit - yet the technique is so efficient, it is described sometimes
as "stripmining" the ocean resources. 31 In fact, due to the efficacy of
the nets, the North Pacific squid fishery June/July catch has declined
28. "Summary of Scientific Information on High Seas Driftnet Fisheries," Greenpeace,
Washington D.C., October 1989, p. 3.
29. "Gill-Netters Churn Up an Outcry,'' Los Angles Times, June 21, 1989, p. 21.
30. National Marine Fishery Service, National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration, "The High Seas Driftnet Fisheries of the North Pacific Ocean, submitted to the U.S.
National Section, International North Pacific Fisheries Commission, Anchorage, Alaska,
September 28, 1989, p. 4.
31. "Trying to Stop the Slaughter,'' Pacific Islands Monthly, (July 1989), p. 8.
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fifty percent and the size of the squid has also decreased. 32 Ocean
resources are renewable, but also exhaustible. A stock can be depleted
to such a point that regeneration of the population might not be possible. Modem fishery management is therefore often based on the concept of Optimum Sustainable Yield (OSY). This type of management
specifies the maximum amount of catch permitted to allow continual
regeneration of the stock. Driftnet fishing is a fishing technique ignorant of the OSY. This method reaps immediate profit without consideration of the possible consequences.
The linkage between the salmon piracy and the driftnet dispute
goes beyond the incidental bycatch of salmon. Ironically, it was the
salmon driftnet fleet that originally generated the squid driftnet fleet.
In the 1950's, the Japanese high sea salmon fleet first used mile-long
driftnets to harvest salmon. The record catches prompted the high sea
squid fleet of Japan to use the same technique in the mid-1970's to
harvest squid. Following Japan's example, the ROC and South Korea
also began to use driftnets on the high seas. The mesh size used to
catch salmon and squids are the same. Consequently, the proximity of
the squid fishery and salmon migration path has tempted certain fishermen to venture into the restricted areas and to use squid driftnets to
catch the more valuable salmon.
The ROC entered the fisheries negotiations in February 1989
under tremendous pressure. The U.S. negotiators took a firm stand
and were determined to get a restrictive agreement out of the ROC.
The ROC could not deny her fishermen's violation of both domestic
regulation and the 1982 Fishery Agreement. Nevertheless, the seasonal restrictions in the North Pacific fishery has already limited the
fishery catches, and the ROC was unwilling to permit further restrictions in her high sea fishery. In the United States, the pressure for an
agreement came from all sides and levels. The salmon industry, the
conservationists, and the regional representatives of Alaska, Oregon,
and Washington all demanded prompt action from the U.S. negotiators. Entangled in the web of issues, and burdened by incriminating
evidence, the ROC negotiators faced a formidable Goliath.
The United States fought fiercely in the negotiations against the
ROC. The negotiations gained much U.S. media attention and congressional furor. What factors so publicized the salmon/driftnet issue
in the United States? What factors made the U.S. such a harsh bargainer? In order to understand the U.S. stand throughout the negotia32. Summary of Scientific Information on High Seas Driftnet Fisheries. supra, note 26,
p. 4.
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tions, it is crucial to analyze the domestic factors in the United States
which influenced the negotiation process. The following section seeks
to answer these questions through an analysis of the domestic salmon/
driftnet issue in the U.S. political and lobbying arena.
Section II: The 1989 Fisheries Negotiation: The U.S. Perspective
In the summer of 1989, the salmon!driftnet dispute captured the
American public's attention. Driftnet articles graced the front pages
of national papers, such as the New York Times and The Washington
Post. 33 Editorials carried trenchant attacks on the use of the driftnet
technology and its impact on the salmon stock. Television networks,
meanwhile, broadcasted special driftnet segments on the evening news.
For several weeks in July, the public and the media clamor over the
issue elevated this previously obscure problem to a national level. On
Capitol Hill, the congressional delegation from the Northwestern fishing states and various lobbyist groups successfully made the driftnet
problem the key issue on the fishery agenda. In the 1989 negotiations
with the ROC , the United States formed an interagency negotiation
team, consisting of members from the State Department and the Commerce Department's National Marine Fishery Service(NMFS). The
negotiation team had established positions and goals to achieve. However, tremendous public and Congressional pressures forced the
United States to amend its position in the negotiations. To the ROC's
dismay, these external pressures forced the U.S. negotiators to a rigidly uncompromising position.
How did the driftnet issue stir such public outcry in the United
States? How did the issue gain so much attention in the Congress?
This section will analyze the salmon/driftnet dispute and determine
the most important factor in advancing this issue. In the fisheries dispute with the ROC , four major factors seemed to have the most impact on the U.S. negotiation stand: 1) An attempt to negotiate a tough
agreement to set a precedent for driftnet talks with other Asian nations, 2) the renewed political climate in favor of conservation 3) the
concern for U.S. economic interest on both regional and national
levels 4) the lobbying efforts of U.S. fishing industries and
conservationists.
Setting a Precedent
During six months of fisheries talks with the ROC, the United
33. "Vandal Fleets of the Pacific," New York Times, September 5, 1989, p.Al8; GillNetter Churns Up an Outcry, supra, note 27, p.2l.
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States was also consulting with the two other North Pacific dirftnetters, South Korea and Japan. The negotiations with the ROC were
crucial because the ROC had 165 vessels in the region and was the
chief culprit in salmon poaching. 34 Japan and South Korea had 500
and 130 vessels in the area respectively. 3 s Clearly, the ROC driftnet
fleet was only part of the problem in the North Pacific. In this situation, for the United States to construct an effective management
scheme in the North Pacific, she needed to negotiate successfully with
all three nations.
Although the ROC was the key salmon poacher in the North Pacific, the real fishing force in the area was Japan. Japan had the largest
fleet in the area, and was the most efficient harvester in the squid fishery. To further supplement its harvest, the Japanese fishing industry
contracted many of the ROC vessels to operate in the area, to the
extent that some of the ROC squid vessels had Japanese captains and
crew. 36 More importantly, reliable information from Japan had confirmed that several Japanese fishing companies had contracted ROC
vessels to harvest salmon illegally, to compensate for the decreased
Japanese salmon quota set by the International North Pacific Fisheries
Commission(INPFC). These vessels, estimated up to 114, harvested
specifically for salmon in the North Pacific. 37 These facts threw the
poaching problem in a different light. ROC salmon poachers served
essentially as a Japanese ploy to get around the salmon quota. One
can even claim that the Japanese were responsible for these ROC vessels poaching in the North Pacific. Thus, a tough agreement over the
driftnet/salmon problem with Japan must compliment a tough agreement with the ROC .
The South Korean operation in the squid fishery also exceeded
that of the ROC. Korean vessels harvested on the average three times
as much squid as the ROC fleet. 38 Furthermore, the South Korean
fleet, unlike the ROC or the Japanese fleet, had no seasonal fishing
boundaries in the North Pacific. 39 The 1989 North Pacific Fisheries
Negotiations with South Korea began therefore on an empty slate.
Negotiating without precedents, it was difficult for the United States
34. Report of Secretary of Commerce, supra , note 12, p. 12.
35. Report of Secretary of Commerce, supra , note 12, pp. 10-11.
36. U.S. Congress, House, Committee on Merchant Marine and Fisheries, Magnuson
Fishery Conservation and Management Act of 1976 Reauth.-Part II, lOlst Congress, 1st
session, 1989, p. 109.
37. Ibid., p. 114.
38. National Marine Fisheries Service, The High Seas Driftnet, supra, note 28, p. 14.
39. National Marine Fisheries Service, The High Seas Driftnet, supra, note 28, p. 114.
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to establish a tough, restrictive agreement with South Korea immediately. Nonetheless, it was crucial for the United States to negotiate
successfully with the Koreans to protect her fishery interests in the
North Pacific. Moreover, such an agreement must also be comparable
to the agreement signed with the ROC and Japan to construct a comprehensive strategy for the North Pacific.
The negotiations with the ROC were intrinsically linked to the
fisheries talks with both Japan and South Korea. The United States
was well aware of the impact of one agreement on another country's
stand in the negotiations. She understood that these three countries
had common interest in maintaining its driftnet operations and would
discuss and possibly strategize together throughout their individual
negotiation processes. In lieu of these circumstances, the ROC , in
many ways, was the easiest of the three driftnetters with whom to negotiate. First, the United States had much direct evidence against
ROC salmon poaching. Second, the ROC was diplomatically and economically dependent on the United States. The ROC was extremely
cautious with her relations with the United States, and taking full advantage of the ROC's subordinate position, the United States negotiated hard against the ROC .
It was in the American interest to obtain tough agreements early
on, to set precedents for the later negotiations. With this in mind, the
United States used the AIT-CCNAA agreement as a precedent for a
Korean agreement. She also wanted a tough agreement with the ROC
as a step to curb Japanese schemes to exploit the quota situation. After the ROC agreed to the accord in August, an American official, in
response to Korea's reluctance to come to an agreement, said "Any
Korean agreement would have to be at least as tough as that signed by
the ROC. Otherwise, efforts to get a stronger agreement from Japan
next year would be undermined. " 40 This official then added " The
whole effort to monitor driftnets could go down the tubes if we don't
get tough with the Koreans." 41 This statement clearly reflected a
strategy to progressively regulate and restrict the squid fleet operations
in the North Pacific. The 1989 negotiations appeared to be the first
stage toward a complete ban on driftnetting in the area. The negotiations with the ROC were to establish an accord to begin the process
for such a ban.
40. Clyde Farnsworth, "Taiwan to Let U.S. Monitor Drift-Net Fishing Practices," The
New York Times, August 26, 1989, p. Dl.
41. Ibid., p. Dl.
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Environmental Concerns

Many experts agreed that the 90's will be the Earth decade and
that environmental concerns have become a massive world-wide
force. 42 According to Futurist Edith Weiner of the Manhattan management consulting firm Weiner Edrich Brown," Environmentalism
will be the next major political idea, just as conservatism and liberalism have been in the past."43 These experts, so far, appear to be
right. The New York Times/CBS News poll regularly asked the public "If protecting the environment is so important that requirements
and standards cannot be too high, and continuing environmental improvements must be made regardless of cost." In September 1981, of
those surveyed, 45 percent agreed and 42 percent disagreed. In June
1989, 79 percent agreed and only 18 percent disagreed. 44 For the first
time, liberals and conservatives, Democrats and Republicans, professed concern for the environment in roughly equal numbers. After
almost a decade of Reagan indifference toward conservation, the Bush
administration, in response to this societal trend, came into the office
with promises of a cleaner and healthier environment. George Bush,
dubbed the "environmental president."45 has made the environment a
priority on his agenda and has nurtured the political climate for conservation. In addition, the 1980's marked the beginning of a series of
global or cross-border environmental threats ranging from largescaled global warming to cross-border acid rain problems. 46 On the
international level, the United States was especially concerned with
the environmental hazards which she herself did not create, yet nonetheless, experienced. The driftnet issue resembled this type of problem
in that Americans, though not high sea driftnetters, has to bear the
consequence of driftnetting. By the late 1980's, environmental protection had become a unavoidable issue for the U.S. Congress. By the
end of the 80's, therefore, conservation has already gained much political momentum. The driftnet issue, from this point of view, was a
perfect environmental issue both domestically and internationally. On
the domestic level, the nets were depleting the salmon stock, an American private good. On the global level, the nets were dwindling the
high sea marine resources, a public good.
42. David, Kirkpatrick,"Environmentalism: The New Crusade," Fortune, Vol. 121,
February 12, 1990, p. 44.
43. Ibid., p. 44.
44. Ibid., p. 46.
45. Cable News Network, "Headline News," Atlanta, Georgia, January 9, 1990.
46. ''The Whole Earth Agenda," US News & World Reports, Vol. 107, (December 25
1989/January 1, 1990), p. 50.
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Driftnet fishing has he¢n in progress in the Northern Pacific since
the late 1970's. However, it took almost a decade of lobbying to attract effective attention to the issue. The advent of the age of conservation clearly helped to win support for the issue. Driftnet fishing
went against all the principles of conservation. It was a fishing technology concerned only with the short-term profit and ignorant of possible environmental damage. 47 The drought of 1988, the smog in
major U.S. cities, and the Exxon Valdez oil spill have sensitized public
awareness to environmental protection in the late 1980's. President
Bush promised to lead America toward greater" environmental ethics."48 The Congress, appealing to both constituents and real environmental hazards, also began legislating environmental bills such as the
Clean Air Act. American politicians have recognized that wanton pillage of America's natural resources can no longer be permitted.
Driftnet fishing, in "stripmining" the ocean and depleting the salmon
stocks, became easily a focus of attack in the Congress. In fact, to
highlight the severity of the problem, Greenpeace, the global conservation group, stated before the U.S. House of Representatives subcommittee on Human Rights and International Organization, that the
technology was "posing hazards to the marine environment that are
on par with other major global environmental concerns, such as . . .
global warming, ozone layer destruction and deforestation." 49 The environment had become a major concern to the American public. The
increased emphasis the American public placed on the quality of the
environment helped to advance the driftnet issue.
The U.S. Congress rallied against driftnetting aggressively. The
combination of the domestic conservation enthusiasm and international environmental demands made the driftnet issue an appropriate
issue to tackle. First, the issue conformed to the "conservation ethics"
popular with the American public at the time. Second, foreign fishermen were not constituents. In essence, then, the congressional representatives were faced with a classic "us vs. them" situation with
virtually unanimity of support. 50 The scope of congressional lobbying
47. "High Sea Driftnets," Greenpeace Pacific Campaign, Washington, D.C., supra,
note 28, p. 2.
48. George Bush, "Promises to Keep," Sierra, Vol. 73, (November/December 1988), p.
62.
49. Gerald Leape, Testimony on Behalf of the Entanglement Network Coalition Regarding an Oversight Hearing on Drift Gil/nets before the Subcommittee on Human Rights and
International Organizations, Greenpeace, U.S.A., Washington, D.C., September 28, 1989,
p. 1.
50. Pacific Seafood Processors Association, "Illegal High Seas Salmon Interception,"
supra, note 21, p. 10.
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went beyond the elimination of salmon poaching. In addition to demanding restrictive agreements on the Asian driftnetters, many representatives desired a complete ban on the technology. Representative
Peter A. DeFazio (Oregon) introduced a bill to prohibit any import of
fish caught by driftnets. 51 Representative Jolene Unsoeld (Washington), with thirty five Congressional sponsors, also introduced "The
Marine Resource Protection and Driftnet Use Cessation Act of 1989"
to mandate a ban on driftnet fishing by 1992. 52 In addition, Senator
Frank Murkowski (Alaska), Senator Ted Stevens (Alaska), Representative Don Young (Alaska) and Representative John Miller (Washington) were all actively involved in efforts to ban driftnetting. The
environmental hazards of driftnetting prompted a conservation-conscious Congress to act vigorously against the technology and its users.
The rise of the environmental movement in the United States forced
the U.S. negotiators to take a unyielding stand against the ROC.
Economics-Federal Fisheries Management

The salmon industry in the United States "nurses" thousands of
salmon yearly in its hatcheries. As part of the federal Magnuson Fishery Conservation and Management Act of 1976 (MFCMA), the government, both state and federal, initiated numerous programs to
enhance salmon harvests. 53 The ROC fishing vessels interception of
these salmon had frustrated the U.S. efforts to increase her salmon
stock and brought congressional attention to the situation. Evidence
of salmon poaching by the driftnet fleets of the North Pacific persuaded the Congress in 1987 to pass the the Driftnet Impact, Monitoring, Assessment and Control Act (the Driftnet Act). 54 The act
identified driftnetting as the key culprit in depleting U.S. marine resources. Through the act, the Congress, sought to preserve and enhance America's marine resources, in particular, the salmon stock.
The 1987 Driftnet act, passed under extreme pressure from the
fishery lobby and the environmentalists, was designed to better understand the technology and regulate its use. 55 The act called for negotiations with the driftnet nations to find a cooperative solution to the
51. Timothy Egan, "New Evidence of Ecological Damage Brings a Call to Ban DriftNet Fishing," New York Times, November 15, 1989, p. Al3.
52. Magnuson Fishery Conservation and Management Act of 1976, Reauth. Part II,
supra, note 34, p. 6.
53. Edward Wolf, "U.S. Responsibilities," supra, note 10, pp. 56-57.
54. Report of Secretary of Commerce, supra, note 13, pp. 1-3.
55. Clyde Farnsworth, "Taiwan to Let U.S. Monitor Drift-Net Fishing Practices,"
New York Times, August 26, 1989, p. 33.
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issue. Specifically, the act mandated for negotiations of 1) an adequate
monitoring and assessment agreement for the deployment of scientific
observers on squid driftnet vessels, and 2) an adequate enforcement
agreement with particular emphasis on the control of fishing in areas
and seasons where significant number of U.S. marine resources, particularly salmon, may be taken. The Commerce Secretary, with the
assistance of the Secretary of State, was responsible for negotiating
these agreements by the summer of 1989. If an agreement can not be
negotiated, the president of the United States shall retaliate with the
Fishermen's Protection Act, which placed an embargo on a nation's
fishery imports to the United States. The 1989 AIT-CCNAA Fisheries Negotiations was thus carried out pursuant to the Driftnet Act.
The Driftnet Act established the negotiation guidelines, and placed
legal and time pressures on the U.S. negotiators to obtain a favorable
agreement from the ROC .
The U.S. 200-mile coastal zone is the largest in the world,
amounting to 2,222 square kilometers. 56 The marine resources in
these waters, based on Food and Agriculture Organization (FAO) research, contained around 15-20 percent of the global fisheries resources. 57 The Magnuson Fishery Conservation and Management Act
of 1976 (MFCMA) was designed to preserve U.S. marine resources
for U.S. fishermen. Through MFCMA, the U.S. government assumed
complete jurisdiction in managing the marine resources within her
200-mile EEZ and the anadromous species spawned from her rivers.
In 1989, the MFCMA expired, and hearings were held in Boston,
Washington D.C., Seattle, and Anchorage before the House Subcommittee on Fishery and Wildlife Conservation and the Environment to
reauthorize the act with the needed changes. In Seattle and
Anchorage the focus of the hearings was placed particularly on
driftnetting, and of all the Asian driftnetters, the ROC was singled out
as the "exemplary poacher." At the hearing, Ambassador Edward
Wolf, deputy director of the State Department's Bureau of Ocean and
International Environment and Scientific Affairs, stated to the subcommittee that the act has been extremely successful. Direct allocation of catch to foreign fishing fleets had fallen from 1980's total of
2,176,789 (mt) down to 51,577 (mt) in 1989. The American commercial and recreational fishing industries had prospered through the act.
56. Alexander Lewis & Robert Hodgson, "The Impact of the 200-Mile Economic Zone
on the Law of the Seas", San Diego Law Review, (December 1975), pp. 574-575 et seq.
57. Tsai Chien-ta, Mei-kuo yu-ye fa jan cheng-tse chi kuan-li ts'uo- shi yen-chiou hsinde pao-kao, (United States Fishery Policy Development and Management Plan, Summary
Report), Taipei, Taiwan: Council of Agriculture, 1986, p. 2.
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The United States has finally gained complete control over her EEZ
resources. In the same statement, however, Ambassador Wolf also
pointed to salmon poaching in the North Pacific. He remarked that
the ROC vessels, in particular, have been sighted many times by the
Coast Guard, operating in the restricted zones. Wolf stressed the fact
that in order for MFCMA to be completely successful, the United
States and the driftnettters must come to terms on the issue of high sea
salmon interception. To resolve the problem, he suggested extensive
international cooperation to advance U.S. fishery interests 58
The management of the U.S. anadromous species was a crucial
aspect of the MFCMA. The U.S. government had used millions of
dollars implementing many programs to increase the salmon stock.
These programs produced numerous salmon hatcheries on land and
assisted the juvenile salmon in their journeys to the ocean. The United
States had essentially "farmed" her salmon runs through meticulous
management strategies. The state of Oregon, for example, persuaded
the Bonneville Power Co., who had constructed a dam on the Columbia river, to spend more than $30 million annually to permit salmon
migration to and from the ocean. 59 The state, in an effort to managing the salmon stock, lost an additional $40 million annually in power
revenue. 60 This kind of sacrifice reflected the importance of the
salmon industry to the state. With high sea salmon poaching, the
money spent on this kind of management was lost. With salmon
poaching, the MFCMA could not effectively manage the anadromous
species of U.S.-origin. The federal government, consequently, took
quick actions to curb the driftnet poaching on the high seas.
During the subcommittee hearings on MFCMA, the emotions of
the Northwest congressional representatives ran high. Throughout
the hearings, these representatives stressed angrily their frustration
with salmon poaching on the high seas. Furthermore, while the hearing was in progress in Boston, the U.S. Coast Guard was in hot pursuit
of a ROC squid vessel suspected of salmon poaching. The attention
was thus focused on the ROC. 61 While the State Department, repre58. Edward Wolf, "U.S. Responsibilities", supra , note 10, pp. 56-58.
59. Teresa Carp, "Fishermen Fight Doomsday Device," Oregon Business, (August
1989), p. 52.
60. Kai Lee, "Columbia River Basin," Environment, Vol 31, No. 6, (July/August
1989), p. 11.
61. U.S. Congress, House, Committee on Merchant Marine and Fisheries,
Reauthorization of the Magnuson Fisheries Conservation and Management Act of 1976,
Hearing before the Subcommittee on Fisheries and Wildlife Conservation and the Environment on H.R. 2061, 101st Congress, 1st session, 1989, p. 6.
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sented by Ambassador Edward Wolf, advocated cooperation and caution, the Congress persons demanded immediate and tough actions.
Representative John Miller (Washington) demanded immediate
boarding of the suspected ROC vessel on the high seas. Representative Don Young (Alaska) suggested trade sanctions and exclaimed,
"Until you take very strong action, Taiwan is going to laugh at you.
I've been around them long enough to know that. " 62 Representative
Jolene Unsold (Washington) wanted to amend the MFCMA to include the assumption that any salmon found on a squid driftnet vessel
is a U.S. salmon. The Coast Guard and the State Department came
under heavy criticism for their adherence to international law, which
prohibited forced boarding on the high seas. The department was also
criticized for not using economic sanctions against the ROC for her
fishermen's violation in poaching salmon. 63 The incident was
presented in a "crisis" context and the ROC dubbed a "pirate."
North American salmon spawned in United States belonged to the
United States. The ROC fishing vessels' interception of salmon violated not only the LOS Convention, but also undermined years of U.S.
domestic efforts, through the MFMCA, to nurture her salmon stocks.
Economics-Industry Analysis

From the national standpoint, the salmon industry is really the
jewel of the U.S. fishing industry. The United States harvested 562
thousand pounds of salmon in 1987, which had an ex-vessel value of
$596 million. In term of poundage, this was ten percent of the overall
U.S. fish catch in 1987. In term of value, however, this was a substantial thirty-seven percent of the 1987 overall U.S. fish ex-vessel value.
Of all the marine species harvested by the United States, salmon had
the highest value, exceeding even the shrimp industry in 1987, which
had traditionally been the most valuable. The salmon industry has
had a pivotal position in the U.S. fishery economy. In addition, because salmon harvests in the United States are concentrated only in
the Northwest states, the poaching problem in the North Pacific became even more urgent. 64
On the regional level, the Northwest is truly America's fishery.
The region produced five billion pounds of edible fish in 1988, which
constituted fifty percent of the overall fishery harvests in the United
62. Ibid., p. 23.
63. Ibid., p. 22.
64. U.S. Department of Commerce, Statistical Abstract of the United States, Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Oflice,l988, pp. 664-669.
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States(see Graph 1). 65 Alaska fishermen alone harvested 60 percent of
the annual U.S. EEZ catch, amounting to $3.5 billion (see Graph 2). 66
Nationally, Alaska is ranked first in fishery produce value. The state
of Washington, on the other hand, is ranked number seven in both
catch poundage and value. 67 Within the region's fishing industries, the
salmon industry formed the backbone of the fishery harvests. It was
the bread and butter for many constituents of the state of Alaska,
Washington, and Oregon.
In Alaska, the commercial fishing industry has replaced the oil
and gas industry as the most valuable private industry. With 60 percent of her residents fishermen, the state can rightly be called the fishing state. While oil and gas reserves may dwindle, fishery resources
are renewable. Alaska's fishing industry can thus only grow in importance. The salmon industry is by far the most important fishery in
Alaska. Alaska salmon landing in 1985, for example, was sixteen
times that of the salmon landings in Washington state (see Graph 3).
The fishery industry contributed $745 million to the state of Alaska in
1988, which amounted to 48.2 percent of the overall ex-vessel value
for the state in that year (see Appendices 4 & 5). High sea salmon
interception appeared to have had the most impact on the Pink and
Chum returns in the Southeast region of the state. The state has established special governor's task force and special bureaus to study and
combat the problem. On Capitol Hill, state representatives Don
Young, Frank Murkowskis and Ted Stevens have all lobbied actively
for the salmon industry 68
The state of Washington, harvesting up to sixty percent of the
nation's food fish, is also very much dependent on her fishery income
(see Appendices 6 & 7). Washington has more than 36,000 fishermen
and the combined fisheries contribution to the state in 1988 amounted
to more than $3 billion. 69 Many major seafood companies have headquarters in Seattle and operate also out of the state in Alaska or Oregon. In Washington, the salmon catch in 1988 amounted to $240
million and accounted for forty two percent of the overall state fish
catch value. The salmon landing in Washington, though less than
65. Ibid., p. 45.
66. Ibid., p. 173.
67. Statistical Abstract of the United States, supra , note 64, p. 664.
68. Alaska Department of Fish and Game, Division of Commercial Fisheries, A Symposium on the Value of Commercial Fisheries to Alaska, presented at the 15th Annual Meeting of the American Fisheries Society, Juneau, Alaska, November 14-17, 1988, pp. 17-23.
69. Reauthorization of the Magnuson Fisheries Conservation and Management Act ,
supra, note 61, p. 3.
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Alaska, is still nine times that of the combined salmon landings in
Oregon and California(see Graph 3). The state was eager to maintain
this industry. In response to salmon poaching, the seafood processors,
the environmentalists, and the fishermen's groups have joined their
voices, condemning driftnetting. The state's congressional representatives such as John Miller and Jolene Unsoeld were also very aggressive
in promoting the salmon industry's causes on Capitol Hill.
The salmon industry is also crucial to the state of Oregon.
Although relatively speaking, the industry is much smaller in Oregon
than in either Alaska or Washington, it nonetheless provides the state
with substantial revenue. According to the Oregon Department of
Fish and Wildlife (ODFW), the landed value of salmon in the state
was $36 million in 1988. The recreational salmon income was $11
million and the total personal income effect of both commercial and
recreational salmon industry was $66 million. 70 At the turn of the
century, Oregon's Columbia River was famous for its rich salmon
runs. Due to overfishing, however, the run has been depleted by more
than ninety percent. 71 The high value of salmon had prompted the
state to try to rebuild these runs through more extensive management.
Salmon poaching interfered with the efforts to restock the salmon
runs. The state thus also lobbied to curb the poaching problems.
The salmon industry is a key sector of the U.S. fishing industry
and a major component of the Northwest economy. The U.S. government has ploughed millions of dollars and spent years of research in
stocking the salmon population. The ROC, in pirating salmon on the
high seas, not only deprived the United States of her immediate profits, but also decreased the future salmon stock by intercepting the fish
before they could spawn. Moreover, the ROC "piracy" has been alleged to disrupt years of American data-gathering and research on the
salmon habitat. In response, the United States negotiated hard to
avert the "salmon crisis."
The Anti-Driftnet Lobby
Lobbying was a major force throughout the entire negotiation
process. The lobbyists, working closely with Congressional representatives, maintained the focus and the intensity of the issue at hand. Lobbying is, of course, nothing new in American politics. The driftnet/
salmon dispute, however, has spurred a different kind of lobbying.
The dispute created a lobbying alliance with tremendous resources and
70. Teresa, Carp, "Fishermen Fight Doomsday Device;" supra , note 59 pp. 52-53.
71. K.ai Lee, "Columbia River Basin," supra , note 60, p. 8.
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varying dimensions. This anti-driftnet lobby consisted basically of the
global conservation group Greenpeace, commercial seafood processors, the Pacific Seafood Processors Association (PSP A), and two fisherman's group, Bering Sea Fishermen's Association and South East
Alaska Coalition Opposed to Piracy of Salmon (SEACOPS). These
forces lobbied on all levels from the UN General Assembly to the fishing town of Ketchikan. The alliance summoned each group's
strengths and supplemented each other's weaknesses. It forwarded the
driftnet issue to both the public and to Capitol Hill. Both, in turn,
translated these concerns into political pressure on the U.S. negotiators from the State and Commerce Departments.
Northwest lobbying activities constituted the backbone of the
anti-driftnet lobby. Regional lobbying groups consisted of both the
fishermen and fishery businesses. The lobbying activities were carried
out on the grass-roots level in the states and in Washington D.C. In
Seattle, one of the most active and effective salmon lobbies was the
PSPA. The group, with offices in Seattle, Juneau, and Washington,
consisted of various seafood processing firms around the Northwest
region. PSPA, with 75 years of history, was the oldest fish lobby in
the Northwest72 and had the financial resources and the expertise to
perform calculated lobbying activities on both the state and national
level.
The PSPA lobby took two lobbying approaches. On one level it
tried to persuade the politicians to pass tougher measures against
driftnetters. On another level, it worked closely with the U.S. government in collecting data on the driftnet technology and in prosecuting
salmon poachers. PSPA's 200-page action plan against Salmon piracy
thoroughly documented the history of salmon piracy, the legal actions
against piracy and the group's strategy in combating the piracy. 73
PSP A's immediate goals in its lobbying were to broaden the support
for its cause and to maintain the level of outrage among the public. It
was disappointed with the State Department's soft-line, cautious approach to the driftnet nations and demanded prompt measures against
the nations of the ROC , Japan, and South Korea. To garner broader
support, PSPA suggested to its member companies an alliance with
the conservationists. It also suggested the hiring of a public relations
firm to transmit to the public first- hand documentation on illegal fishing. The lobbying group planned to use the 'shock value' of the photo72. Magnuson Fisheries Conservation and Management Act of 1976, Reauth.-Part II,
supra , note 36, p. 197.
73. Pacific Seafood Processors Association, "Illegal High Sea Salmon Interception,"
supra , note 21, p. 1 et seq.
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graphs and 'sting operations' targeted toward the poachers to summon
public sympathy and support. On the legislative level, PSPA maintained direct and constant contact with politicians such as Governor
Cowper of Alaska and Representative John Miller of Washington.
The alliance of PSPA and the state government worked extremely well
on the driftnet issue. The extensive correspondences between the organization and various political leaders, such as Secretary of State
George Schultz reflected its scope of influence in Washington. 74
The efforts of PSPA extended from the state to the nation's capital. The outrage of the fishermen, on the other hand, supplemented
such efforts on the grass-roots level. In Ketchikan, Alaska, the fishermen and fishery biologists formed the SEACOPS. Although the
group was only formed in 1988 and had only a membership of 2000, it
provided first-hand information on driftnet poaching. 75 The grassroots group focused its attention solely on salmon piracy and occupied
the front-line of this international dispute. Unlike PSPA, which formulated calculated action plans, SEACOPS lobbied on emotions. The
poaching problem affected the fishermen· directly and severely.
SEACOPS rejected the "path of cooperation" as a solution to the
poaching problem. 76 Instead, it supported trade sanctions, increased
Coast Guard patrols and the elimination of driftnet fishing. The views
of SEACOPS has garnered support from more powerful fishermen
groups, such as the Bering Sea Fishermen's Association, the Southeast
Alaska Seiner's Association, and the United Fishermen of Alaska.
The Bering Sea Fishermen's Association (BSFA) long involved
with the driftnet problem in the Bristol Bay, for example, has been a
powerful ally for SEACOPS. A traditionally powerful fishermen's
lobby, the group has detailed documentation on past Japanese driftnet
violations and has lobbied actively in the U.S. Congress. SEACOPS
and BSFA worked together on the poaching problem involving the
three Asian nations. Representing the interest of the local fishermen,
BSFA was also permitted to express its view in the negotiation's plenary sessions. 77 This grass-roots coalition, having direct access to the
negotiations also exerted additional pressure on the U.S. negotiators.
74. Pacific Seafood Processors Association, "Illegal High Sea Salmon Interception,"
supra , note 21, pp. 180-198.
75. Mark Tennant, SEACOPS Newsletter, Ketchikan, Alaska, 1989, p. l.
76. Mark Tennant, "Trade War Proposed to Save Steelhead and Salmon," Salmon,
Trout, Stee/header, (September 1989), p. 13.
77. Telephone conversation with Mr. George Hurrfurth, U.S. Department of State,
Bureau of Oceans and International Environment and Scientific Affairs, Washington, D.C.,
October 23, 1989.
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In the PSP A action plan, one of the strategies was to unite with
the environmentalists to gain a broader base of support. The strategy
was wise. In the anti- driftnet alliance, one of the most powerful lobbying forces was the conservation group, Greenpeace. Greenpeace is an
international conservation group with four million members worldwide. It has offices in twenty one nations and is active in issues ranging
from anti- nuclear testings to "Save the Whales!' For the past six
years, Greenpeace has appealed for international action to mitigate the
environmental hazards of driftnet technology. 78 Greenpeace has
gained a lot of media coverage for its rather unorthodox means of
protesting. For instance, it has for years interfered with the Japanese
whaling operation by placing its speedcrafts between the harpoon and
the whale. In its effort to ban driftnet fishing, Greenpeace mustered its
resources around the Pacific rim and carried out extensive lobbying in
the United States. Within the overall anti-driftnet lobby, Greenpeace
was responsible for fighting the legal battles and lobbied on the international front.
Greenpeace had been rather successful in the past on the driftnet
issue. It succeeded in persuading the United States to eject the Japanese salmon driftnet fleet from the U.S. EEZ. It also forced the Canadian government to abandon its deep sea driftnet research fishery. In
this round of the fight, however, the group sought for a complete ban
on the technology. In the United States, Greenpeace has 1.25 million
members , 350,000 in the state of Washington alone. In addition,
Greenpeace U.S.A. was a leader among other conservation groups in
the United States. In October 1989, for example, Greenpeace
presented to a House hearing a proposal to ban driftnet fishing on behalf of the Entanglement Network Coalition, a conservation alliance
of 16 environmental groups, totaling 11 million members. 79 With its
influence in the United States, Greenpeace carried out the its driftnet
campaign on both the legislative and the public fronts. To bring public awareness to the problem, Greenpeace conducted a national campaign with mailings and demonstrations. It also began market
research to identify and boycott driftnet-caught fish. On the legislative
side, Greenpeace, presented various proposals at the MFCMA hearing
and at the 1988 International North Pacific Fisheries Convention
meeting in Tokyo. The Greenpeace documentation at these hearings
were thorough and the proposals thoughtful. Despite the group's radi78. Sebia Hawkins, "Letter to the Permanent Representatives to the United Nations,"
Greenpeace, Washington, D.C., Fall, 1989.
79. Gerald Leap, "Testimony on Behalf of the Entanglement Network Coalition,".
supra , note 49, p. 1.
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cal reputation, Greenpeace's efforts in the U.S. legislature on the issue

portrayed it as an intelligent group with reasonable suggestions. In
the United States, the group succeeded in elevating the issue to the
national level and with a broad base of support influenced the congressional attitude on the matter. 80
On the international level, Greenpeace was also active. While,
the group's New Zealand office assisted in the effort to ban driftnet
fishing in the South Pacific, it also successfully persuaded the UN
General Assembly to mandate a ban on the technology worldwide.
Greenpeace representatives also traveled to both the ROC on Taiwan
and Japan to convey their views to the respective govemments. 81 The
reputation of Greenpeace has indeed raised fishery concerns in the
ROC and Japan. To these countries, Greenpeace is a unpredictable
player, capable of real mischief. Greenpeace New Zealand, in fact, has
already threatened to cut the nets in the South Pacific, where the ROC
has 130 vessels fishing for albacore. 82 This decision undoubtedly
brought further international attention on the technology and placed
further pressure on the ROC to stop.
Facing this formidable alliance, the ROC found one fishery lobby
on her side, the American Tunaboat Association. 83 The United States
has a great demand for tuna and imports forty four percent of its tuna
from abroad. The ROC is the second largest supplier of tuna to the
United States. In 1985, she exported around $30 million worth of
tuna from the ROC, equivalent to 14.3 percent of the overall tuna
import. 84 The 1987 Driftnet Law stated that if through negotiations,
an agreement is not forth-coming, the president may retaliate with an
embargo on that country's fishery exports. The tuna industry did not
want to loose one of its main oversea suppliers. It, therefore, lobbied
for a more favorable agreement with the ROC . The impact of the tuna
lobby, however, may never be clear as the ROC yielded to all the U.S.
demands in the agreement.
80. "High Sea Driftnets, " Greenpeace Pacific Campaign, Washington, D.C., Fall,
1989, p. 7.
81. Interview with Mike Hagler, Ocean Ecology Campaigner, Greenpeace New Zealand, Taipei, Taiwan, August 7, 1989.
82. Ibid.
83. Telephone conversation with George Hurrfurth, U.S. State Department, Bureau of
Ocean and International Environment and Scientific Affairs, Washington, D.C., October
23, 1989.
84. Tsai Chien-ta, United States Fisheries Policies Development and Management Plan
supra, note 57, p. 3.
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Impact of the Lobby on the U.S. Negotiators
The anti-driftnet lobby was extremely effective. Throughout the
negotiations, these lobbyists in conjunction with congressional representatives forced a tough U.S. stand against the ROC. The State Department and the Commerce Department wanted an agreement with
the ROC that would resolve the salmon poaching problem and restrict
the driftnet operations. Yet, the departments preferred an agreement
based on the "path of cooperation. " 85 The ROC was a friendly ally of
the United States, and the negotiators did not want to jeopardize the
relationship. Ambassador Edward Wolf of the State Department, for
instance, constantly stressed cooperation and caution in dealing with
the salmon poaching problem. 86
On May 2, 1989, the United States chief negotiator, Richard
Smith negotiated a fishery draft with Japan. Although the draft was
the best monitoring agreement the United States has ever had with
Japan, the fishing lobby found the agreement completely unacceptable.
Opponents of the agreement argued that "path of cooperation" was
unrealistic and demanded a more restrictive agreement. 87 The Secretary of Commerce consequently rejected the May 2 agreement, and the
subsequent June 3rd agreement with Japan was much more restrictive.
Because the U.S. negotiation strategy was to coordinate similar agreements with all three Asian driftnetters, a tough Japanese agreement
therefore resulted also in a tough agreement with the ROC. The lobbyists dictated the U.S. approach to the negotiations. It clearly influenced the outcome of the negotiations.
In the 1989 negotiations with the ROC on Taiwan, the congressional representatives criticized the U.S. negotiators for being placid
and interfered in the process whenever they could. In July, Senator
F. Murkowski (Alaska) disrupted the annual weapon purchase meeting between The ROC's Military Chief of Staff, General Hao Po-tsuen
and the Senate Armed Services Committee Chair, Sam Nunn. Senator
Murkowski then released a press brief threatening to ban arm sales to
the ROC , if the ROC refused to sign the fishery agreement. 88 This
annual meeting was always kept rather confidential to avoid possible
objections from the People's Republic of China. Senator Murkowski's
intrusion infuriated the State Department. The American Institute in
85. Mark Tennant, ''Trade War Proposed to Save Steelhead and Salmon," Salmon,
Trout, Stee/header, (August-September, 1989), p. 12.
86. Edward Wolf, "U.S. Responsibilities," supra , note 10, p. 58.
87. Ibid, p. 12.
88. American Institute in Taiwan, Media Summary, "News of General Hau's U.S.
Visit Leaked; Washington Angry," July 28, 1989, p. 1.
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Taiwan (AIT) was, in fact, immediately ordered to avoid any contact
with the senator or his office. 89 Murkowski's actions, however, struck
home. The ROC media headlined the incident and the ROC government considered the threat seriously. The congressional representatives were willing to go to considerable lengths to reach their
objectives. In the driftnet negotiations, the United States negotiators
had to come to terms with all kinds of external pressure, even extreme
ones such as Senator Murkowski's stunt.
Looking at the various factors, the lobbying alliance appears to
have been the most powerful factor in the U.S. negotiating position.
With each group taking on separate responsibilities, the concentrated
lobbying really dictated the U.S. position on driftnet fishing. While
the State Department and the Commerce Department preferred a cooperative scheme to resolve the driftnet/salmon dispute, the lobbying
forces demanded strong and immediate sanctions or regulations to deter the violators. The caution of the interagency negotiators contrasted sharply with the aggressive lobbying demands. In the overall
negotiation process, the United States maintained an extremely adamant position. Although both environmental and economic concerns
were main focuses, the lobbying alone put the negotiators on the spot.
The lobbying directly, and indirectly through the Congress pressured
the American negotiators to detour away from more cooperative
agreements with the ROC. Although the salmon industry and the
conservationists were still not completely satisfied with the agreement,
the agreement was a costly defeat for the ROC government and her
squid driftnet fishery in the North Pacific.
Under congressional pressure, the United States negotiators had
no choice but to negotiate a tough agreement with the ROC. Facing
this formidable opponent, the ROC conceded to virtually every U.S.
demand. Under such pressure could the ROC have negotiated a more
favorable agreement? The next section analyzes the content of the
1989 agreement and its impact on the ROC on Taiwan. It then proposes possible ways which the ROC might be able to negotiate to
reach a more equitable agreement with the United States.
Section III: The 1989 Agreement and Possibilities for a More
Equitable Accord
In the 1989 fisheries talks, the United States and the ROC conducted three rounds of consultations. After careful deliberation, these
89. Meeting with Mr. Spangler, Economic Officer, American Institute in Taiwan,
Taipei, August 12, 1989.
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talks concluded on June 30, 1989 with a preliminary draft on the
driftnet problem in the North Pacific. The signing of a finalized draft
was, however, delayed until August 29 to allow both parties to discuss
the agreement with their respective governments. Under the threat of
an embargo on her fishery exports to the United States, the ROC on
Taiwan reluctantly signed the agreement in Washington D.C. on August. 26, 1989. 90
The major points of the 1989 AIT (U.S.)-CCNAA (the ROC)
Fisheries Agreement are summarized as follows:
1) The squid driftnet fishery is pushed further south from 40 degree latitude N. to 36 degree latitude N ..
2) At no cost to the United States, the ROC is to install automatic real-time vessellocational devices (transmitter) on commercial
driftnet vessels and transports. The installation should cover 10 percent of all vessels in 1989 and reach 100 percent coverage by 1990.
3) All harvested fish must be landed in the ROC with strict restrictions on at-sea transfers to transport vessels.
4) The ROC is to introduce legislation to restrict its vessels from
carrying both large-and small-meshed driftnet gear. All such nets are
to be marked for identification.
5) The ROC consents to U.S. Coast Guard boarding and inspection ("visits") of all driftnet vessels detected outside the approved fishing area. Vessels inside the approved area may also be boarded, if
under suspected fishing violations.
6) The ROC is to introduce high seas enforcement patrol (two
vessels for 1989 for 200 patrol days, three vessels in 1990 for 310 days)
7) Deployment of one U.S. scientific observer in 1989. In 1990,
the observation program will expand pending further consultation.
8) The ROC to limit the size of her driftnet fleet in the North
Pacific. 91
Although the agreement was to remain effective for only one
year, it was the subject of much controversy in the ROC. The 1989
fisheries negotiation discussed both environmental and economic issues. In the ROC, however, the agreement became less of a debate
over economic interest and conservation, but rather became a dispute
90. American Institute in Taiwan, Annex to the Exchange of Letters between the Coordinating Council for North American Ajfairs(CCNAA) and the American Institute in Taiwan
(AfT) Regarding the high Seas Driftnet Fishing in the North Pacific by Vessels of the Territory Represented by the CCNAA, Washington, D.C., July 13, 1989.
91. North Pacific Driftnet Fishery Negotiation, Alaska Department of Fish and Game,
Juneau, Alaska, October, 1989, attachment 2.
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over sovereignty. 92 Throughout the years of AIT- CCNAA fishing
consultations, the United States continuously demanded the right to
board and inspect ROC vessels for fishing violations - even if the
vessel was in international waters. According to the 1958 High Seas
Convention and the 1982 UN LOS Convention, vessels in international waters are subject to the flag-state's jurisdiction.93 In other
words, these vessels represent the sovereign territorial extensions of
their respective flag-states. Therefore, under these generally accepted
conventions, a non-flag state party, in order to board a foreign vessel
in international waters, must receive either the explicit consent of the
vessel's captain, or the permission from the governing authority of
that vessel's flag state. The 1989 agreement, however, permitted U.S.
boarding on the high seas. Many people in the ROC felt that this was
a direct violation of her sovereign rights and criticized the government's seemingly cowardly stand against the United States. In truth,
ROC's admitted goal in arriving at an agreement was the prevention
of a U.S. embargo on her fishery exports. In fact, the ROC has noted
that if the sanctions were applied, she will not be obligated to fulfill
any part of the agreement. 94 The signing of the agreement provided
temporary relief to American fishing interests and safe-guarded ROC
fishery exports to the United States.
The 1989 agreement was, in many ways, a capitulation by the
ROC. Despite the ROC government's claim that the 1989 fishery accord was mutually beneficial, the text of the 1989 agreement proved
otherwise. The general language of the agreement placed the majority
of the demands and responsibilities on the ROC. In analyzing the
main verbs used in each of the articles in the agreement, fourteen verbs
were designated for CCNAA, five for AIT, and three for both parties.
Throughout the agreement, CCNAA had to provide, ensure, implement, accept, introduce, install, limit, and be responsible. AIT, on the
other hand, needed only to understand, board, and in one article, assist CCNAA. The agreement was lopsided, and CCNAA had to bear
the burden of the agreement. The only major ROC request in the negotiations was an arbitration article to enable third party mediation in
disputes. The arbitration article was requested in July 1989, however,
only after much public outrage in the ROC over the draft of the bilateral agreement. The United States rejected the request and the agree92. Lincoln, Kaye, "A Quest for Profits," Far Eastern Economic Review, Vol. 145, No.
39, (September 28, 1989), p. 138.
93. Louis Henkin, Richard Crawford Pugh, Oscar Schachter, Hans Smit, eds., International Law Cases and Material, St. Paul Minn: West Publishing Co., Chapter 15.
94. North Pacific Driftnet Fishery Negotiation, supra , note 91, p. 2.
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ment was signed without the article. The 1989 AIT-CCNAA fisheries
accord was set on unequal footing, penalizing the ROC on Taiwan,
and benefiting only the United States. 95
Critique of the Agreement
The 1989 agreement not only placed the majority of the responsibilities on the ROC on Taiwan, but also significantly hindered ROC
fisheries operations in the North Pacific. It was an extremely restrictive agreement which may cause severe economic dislocations in the
ROC squid industry. The following sections look at the main points
of the 1989 agreement and analyze its adverse impact on the ROC
fishing industry.
Fisheries Restrictions
One of the major objectives of the 1989 agreement was to restrict
and control the ROC's driftnet fleet in the North Pacific. To do so,
the United States demanded that the ROC government carry out the
following points in the agreement: 1) move the fishery boundaries further south, 2) limit the size of its fleet in the North Pacific, 3) restrict
the vessels from carrying different mesh-sized driftnets, and 4) maintain strict at-sea transfers and make certain that all harvested fish be
landed in the ROC.
Boundaries restrictions clearly infringed upon Taiwan's economic
interests in the area. In 1986, the "The Taiwan Territory North Pacific Squid Fishery Operational Regulations.," which first set the fishery boundaries at forty degree Latitude N., was, for example, partially
responsible for a forty percent catch drop from 21,807 metric tons to
13,000 metric tons. 96 The present agreement to move the boundaries
to 36latitude N. further reduced the size of the fishery and could dramatically decrease ROC's catch in the North Pacific squid fishery.
Fleet size reduction could also have grave consequences on the
ROC operations in the North Pacific. In this squid fishery, the ROC
was consistently behind her competitors, Japan and South Korea. 97
Limiting the size of ROC's fleet thus placed her at a even greater disadvantage with these countries. Although the United States also requested both Japan and South Korea to reduce their fleet sizes, the
95. Annex to Exchange of Letter, supra , note 90.
96. Kuo Tsong-hai, A Study of the Nation's Driftnet Industry, supra, note 12, p. 13.
97. National Marine Fisheries Service, NOAA, The High Seas Driftnet Fisheries of the
North Pacific Ocean. submitted to the U.S. National Section, INPFC, Anchorage, Alaska,
September 28, 1989, chart p. 16.
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ROC could be affected most severely because of her smaller profit
margins. A kilogram of ROC-caught squid, for example, could only
sell for 24 NT(the New Taiwan Dollar). In contrast, Korean and Japanese squid catches can often bring 40 to 50 NT. 98 The fleet restriction could raise the operational cost, eliminate any profit margin the
ROC might have now, and force the ROC to abandon the fishery
altogether.
Restriction on carrying multi-size meshed nets prevents the squid
vessels from harvesting other fish in the high seas. The ROC squid
vessels used small-meshed driftnets to harvest squid. Recently, some
of these vessels have also began to carry large-meshed nets targeting
albacore. 99 With multi-sized nets, a vessel has increased flexibility in
its operations. It can, for instance, harvest albacore in the area during
the albacore season and switch to smaller nets to harvest squid during
the squid season. The ROC government has encouraged this multifaceted approach as a means to increase fishery catches. 100 The 1989
agreement's restrictions on carrying multi-sized nets clearly undermined ROC's strategy to expand and diversify her fisheries operations.
At-sea transfers are a means of stream-lining fisheries operations.
The North Pacific squid season runs for seven months from March to
November. It would have been extremely inefficient to have the squid
vessels return to the home port every time its storage is full. Thus, in
order to permit the vessels to operate full-time in the fishery, fishing
companies periodically send out transport vessels to transfer the
catches from the squid vessels, allowing these squid vessels to continue
their operations in the fishery. The 1989 agreement placed strict restrictions on at-sea transfers and mandated that all catches to be
landed in the ROC on Taiwan. In the past, salmon poachers have
often transferred the pirated salmon on to transports and landed them
in a country such as Singapore, which did not have regulations against
salmon fishing. 101 Although the 1989 restriction may close off this
poaching channel, it also constrained the driftnet fleet's overall at-sea
transfer operations. The transports in effect must return to the ROC
after receiving the cargo. This will therefore not allow these transports to sail to other ports and sell the catch directly in another coun98. Chou Hsing-hsuen, "Solid Policies are the Fishing Industry's Guiding Light,"
Chong-kuo shih-pao, (China Times), August 10, 1989, editorial page.
99. Kuo Tsong-hai, A Study of the Nation's Driftnet Industry, supra , note 12, p. 4.
100. Ibid., p. 5.
101. Pacific Seafood Processors Association, "Illegal high Seas Salmon Interception,"
supra, note 21, exhibition. 1.
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try. The restriction interfered with this high seas operational
flexibility, and could prove costly to the squid fishermen.
Enforcement Schemes

Restrictions without effective enforcement can often aggravate
the problem at hand. In 1986, when establishing squid fishery boundaries, the ROC failed to put into place comprehensive enforcement
schemes. These restrictions had, therefore, only symbolic value. The
1989 agreement contained more comprehensive enforcement strategies. In this agreement, however, the added fishery restrictions demanded enforcement strategies that extended beyond the available
resources. Specifically, the 1989 accord requested 1) increased ROC
patrol in the high seas and 2) the installation of the locational
transmitters.
The installation of transmitters is a clear violation of Taiwanese
sovereignty. Transmitters are electronic locational devices which send
out signals via satellite to a central tracking monitor. The device is
used to track the locations of the vessels on the high seas in order to
prevent the vessels from sneaking into the restricted fishing zones. In
the United States, paroled prisoners are sometimes required to wear
electronic devices to alert the law enforcement officials of their whereabouts. Similarly, in insisting transmitters installation, the United
States played a the role of a "high seas " police. The ROC, however,
is a sovereign nation, not a U.S. "colony." She needed not to subject
herself to U.S. surveillance. The proposed transmitters installation is,
thus, unacceptable. Furthermore, the transmitters is still at an experimental stage. It has not been commercialized and does not even have
an official name. 102 The ROC, by agreeing to the installation, is serving as a guinea pig to try the efficacy of this device.
The increase in ROC patrols has only symbolic significance. The
North Pacific Squid Fishery is the size of the continental U.S. Introducing two to three patrol vessels will have little impact on the overall
enforcement effort in the area. 103 The additional ROC patrol may
shoulder some of the responsibilities with the U.S. Coast Guard and
has jurisdiction to board her own vessels on the high seas. However,
this small two-vessel force is a unlikely deterrent to salmon poachers.
Increased ROC patrol is a costly operation. However, logistically, this
102. Tsai Cheng-yuan, "Installation of Transponders, Korea and Japan both rejected,
why do we agree," Lian-ho yuan-pao (United Evening News), July 14, 1989, p. 2.
103. Interview with Mr. Chu Ming, Taiwan Tuna Association, August. 10, 1989.
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increase in patrol simply can not enforce the fishery restrictions
effectively.
High Seas Boarding and Inspection

The 1982 LOS Convention guaranteed the freedom of navigation
and fishing on the high seas. It also mandated flag-state jurisdiction
over its own vessels on the high seas. The U.S. insistence on high seas
boarding and inspection infringed upon these rights. Although in the
1989 agreement, the right to board and inspect was also extended to
the ROC, there are no U.S. driftnet vessels in the North Pacific squid
fishery. The Taiwanese patrol will, therefore, not have the opportunity to board a U.S. ship. 104 This part of the agreement was, thus, far
from reciprocal. U.S. unilateral high seas boarding and inspection
fumed people's emotions in the ROC against "Yankee oppression." 10'
It also greatly undermined the public confidence in the ROC government. High seas boarding may allow the United States to further her
jurisdiction over her salmon stocks. The insistence for the extension of
this jurisdiction however, strained the two countries' friendship. The
Chinese public in Taiwan, in this incident, has lost a lot of faith in the
ruling Kuomingtang Party and concurrently, increased its 'anti- Yankee' sentiments. The U.S. insistence on high seas boarding not only
caused the ROC government to loose face, but further strained the two
countries' relations.
ROC's Fisheries Expansion

The ROC has not been a conservationist in her fishery operations.
The ROC fishermen have violated both domestic regulations and international agreements in poaching North American salmon. The
1989 agreement tried to resolve these problems by enforcement and
restrictions. In addition to these measures, however, the agreement
should have considered more long-termed remedies to the fishery dispute. To forge a successful fishing agreement between the United
States and the ROC, it is crucial to understand the the ROC fishing
industry and its problems. For years, the the ROC fishing industry has
been a unregulated pillage on the marine environment. The government had neither the will nor the means to regulate its fishery matters.
The fishermen, on the other hand, have taken the opportunity to ig104. Chou Hsing-hsuen, "What did the Nationalist government Achieve?,"Shih-pao
Chou-k'an,(China Times Weekly), July 15, 1989, p. 56.
lOS. American Institute in Taiwan, Media Summary July 14-August 15, Taipei, Taiwan,
August 11, 1989. p. 2.
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nore the few loosely-enforced regulations, and took the opportunity to
capitalize on the profit incentives. United States, wanting a better regulated Taiwanese North Pacific Fishery, should recognize these fundamental problems in the overall Taiwanese fishing industry. The ROC,
wanting a more equitable agreement, should also stress these points.
A Poor Agreement
The 1989 AIT-CCNAA Fishing Agreement was an ad hoc remedy to the fishery problem, designed only to fulfi11 the requirements of
th~ Driftnet Act and to satisfy U.S. lobbying interests. As aforementioned, the CCNAA signed the agreement to avoid economic sanctions. The United States, on the other hand, was satisfied that some
sort of an accord has been reached. With both sides concerned only
with the immediate problems, the 1989 agreement failed to explore the
wider ramification of these disputes. Many of the articles in the 1989
agreement were, therefore, inherently unsound. The accord placed too
much emphasis on restrictions and enforcement, and such reliance on
restrictions and enforcement can only temporarily ameliorate the
problems in the North Pacific. The root problem of the dispute remained largely unresolved. In other words, the 1989 agreement focused on the symptoms, not the disease. It gave temporary relief to the
United States, but it came as a result of considerable costs to the
ROC's fishing industry and undermined the domestic credibility of the
ROC government.
Possibilities for a More Equitable Accord

Could the ROC have negotiated a more favorable accord? The
1989 negotiation between the two countries was adversarial in nature.
The United States felt that the ROC was taking an advantage by
poaching salmon. The ROC, on the other hand, felt victimized by the
U.S. restriction and regulations. International negotiations are often
complicated compromises among different domestic, bureaucratic, and
diplomatic forces. In the 1989 negotiation, the ROC, however, appeared to have compromised to the point of out right surrender. During this round of fisheries negotiations, the ROC seemed have ignored
other options and cocooned herself within the U.S. negotiation
agenda. In spite of intense U.S. pressure, the ROC did not need to
assume a "no-win" situation. The ROC could have negotiated a more
equitable agreement and not compromised the main stipulations made
by the Driftnet Act. In these negotiations, the ROC could have considered the following possibilities: 1)Active negotiator, 2) Joint negotiation session with Japan and gain access to Japan's far superior
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fisheries data, 3) Driftnet conference, 4) International fisheries management, 5) Cooperative training programs, 6) Joint-ventures, and 7)
Joint- monitorship
Active Negotiator
To negotiate effectively, the ROC first has to be an active negotiator. In these negotiations, the United States set the agenda and the
ROC followed. Of all the issues discussed, the key difference was the
question of high seas boarding and inspection. The two countries were
stalemated on the issue, which delayed the entire negotiation process.
High seas boarding and inspection was a matter of principle and rightfully an important issue. Yet, it should not have overshadowed the
overall negotiation process, where the real concerns were the economic benefits and the resource management of the North Pacific.
Even though the United States negotiated largely according to the
guidelines set by the Driftnet Act, the ROC could have skirted the
boarding stalemate by redirecting its negotiation efforts. Instead of following the U.S. negotiation agenda, the ROC should have composed
her own agenda. She could have negotiated actively and influenced the
direction or the focus of the negotiation.
Joint Sessions with Japan
For years, the ROC fishing industry and the ROC government
has focused only on the numerical growth of its harvests. The ROC
did not manage her EEZ fisheries nor did she conduct research, to any
great detail, in her distant water fisheries. In this round of negotiations, the United States had meticulous data and documented
researches to pressure the ROC into the accord. 106 The ROC, on the
other hand, had little data and research to substantiate her claims and
arguments, and as a result the ROC could not be assertive. To improve her negotiation position with the United States, the ROC should
have requested a joint session with Japan. There were many advantages in allying with Japan, which is the world's largest fishing nation.
Japan had thorough documentation and data on the North Pacific
fishery and was largely responsible for contracting ROC vessels to harvest salmon and squid. It was thus logical to discuss the dispute with
the two countries jointly. Inviting Japan to the negotiation could have
provided the ROC with a powerful ally and reduced the condemnation
placed on ROC poaching.
106. Interview with Mr. Tung Ih-Hsiu, Senior Specialist, The Institute of Fishery Biology, National Taiwan University, August 29, 1989.
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Driftnet Conference
Asian countries are not the only driftnetters in the world. In addition to South Korea and Japan, the United States, Spain, and Italy
also have driftnet vessels. The only major difference among these
driftnetters is that the non-Asian countries conduct their driftnet operations inside their own EEZ, while the Asian driftnetters operate on
the high seas. The Asian driftnetters also often deploy nets 30-40
miles long, while the other countries use nets 1-15 miles in length. 107
Due to the efficacy of this technology, however, countries are beginning to lengthen the nets and set them in various fisheries. The
French, for instance, have begun operations in the Bay of Biscay, and
the Italians are driftnetting in the Mediterranean Sea for billfish. 108
The driftnet problem is a global environmental issue. It demands international discussion and resolution.
The ROC should not have to shoulder all the blame for the usage
of driftnet technology. After all, many other countries are also using
this kind of net. Furthermore, a global resolution to the problem may
be more comprehensive than a series of bilateral agreements. The
ROC is naive to the harms of driftnetting. In fact, according to a
report published in 1986 by the Council Of Agriculture (COA), the
council went so far as to encourage the use of driftnets in the coastal
waters because "it was less destructive." 109 Because of this ignorance,
the ROC was in no position to really argue against the United States
on the problem of driftnet fishing. The ROC's fishery interests believed that driftnetting can be regulated to reduce its destructiveness.
An international conference could serve as a forum for just such
discussions.
International Fishery Management
Global environmental problems demand global management.
Similarly, global resources require a global partnership. Various countries are competing for the resources of the North Pacific. To best
allocate the available resources and maintain a sound ecological system, countries should establish a North Pacific fishery management
organization. The present INPFC does not include South Korea or
the ROC, and manages only the salmon harvest in the area. In re107. Marlise Simmons, "Fish Nets Trap Dolphins in the Mediterranean, Too," New
York Times, September 7, 1989, section A, p. AI.
108. Ibid, p. Al3.
109. Yu-yeifa-chanfan-an.(Fisheries Development Plan) Taipei, Taiwan:Council of Agriculture, December 31, 1987, p. 8.
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sponse to the U.S. pressure to limit its operations in the North Pacific,
the ROC could counter-propose an international regime to resolve the
resource problem in this fishery. On one level, the proposal would
soften the U.S. insistence for the ROC to further restrict its fishery
operations. On another level, the establishment of an international regime would not only give the ROC the international de jure recognition she desperately needs, but also offer a more equitable system of
resource allocation. The management regime is a logical long-term
solution to the problems on the North Pacific.
Cooperative Training Programs
Most of ROC's high sea fishery problems are symptoms of an
over-heated and ill-structured fishing industry. To resolve these
problems, both the ROC's industry and government need to work together, to restructure the industry with long-termed objectives. On
the policy level, the ROC needs a comprehensive fishery legislation
similar to the Magnuson Fishery Management and Conservation Act
(MFMCA) to assess, conserve, and manage her resources. On the industrial level, the government, with the assistance of the firms themselves, needs to put into place stronger regulation and enforcement
schemes to control her fleets. Logistically, the government needs to
modernize her fleets to operate more efficiently and effectively. In contrast, the United States has already formulated comprehensive fishery
policies, pioneered effective fishery management plans, and constructed efficient fishing fleets. 110 In the context of the negotiation,
the ROC could attempt to elicit U.S. assistance in these areas. One of
the possible options, for example, might be to establish a fishery training or partnership program with the United States. The ROC could
have her personnel trained under U.S. supervision, and build a modern
fishery management foundation for her fishing industries. The ROC
might have insisted on such programs as quid pro quo to the overall
fishing agreement. In sacrificing some of her short-term gains in the
North Pacific, the ROC, can still gain long-term benefits of a betterregulated and more lasting industry.
Joint Venture

The United States and the ROC shared a common interest in the
tuna fisheries. The 1989 fishery talks, however, focused only on
driftnetting and salmon poaching. To formulate a more equitable
110. Interview with Wu Tien-luan, assistant Editor of China Fisheries News, August 21,
1989.
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agreement, the ROC needs to try to expand the scope of the negotiation. Although the U.S. salmon industry disliked the ROC, the U.S.
tuna industry needed the ROC. The ROC is the second largest supplier of tuna to the United States and has had a congenial relationship
with the U.S. tuna industry. 111 The tuna industry is a traditionally
powerful lobby, and the ROC really should have better utilized this
ally. 112 To ease the tension in the negotiation, the ROC might have
proposed a joint-venture with the U.S. tuna industry. This strategy
will have brought into the negotiation a friendly lobby, agreeable to
the State Department's "path of cooperation." In addition, the jointventure could have enhanced the existing partnership between the two
countries' tuna industries. The ROC may have lost some freedom in
her squid fishery, but she could have made up for that the loss with a
tuna partnership.
Joint Monitorship

The United States played the "high sea" policemen in monitoring
the Taiwanese squid vessels. Although the United States was, to a
certain extent, forced into this role because of the ROC government's
inability to regulate its own fleet, the ROC should not have permitted
complete U.S. monitorship. For a more just set-up, the ROC could
have insisted on joint-monitorship. The two countries could and
should have shared the monitoring responsibilities in enforcing the
fishery order in the area. A Chinese law professor drew the analogy, "
Even if my child was misbehaving, I don't need you to punish him." 113
The ROC is a sovereign state. Yet, if she claims high sea jurisdiction
over her fishing vessels, she should then take on the responsibility of
regulating them. A joint-monitorship program with the United States
can be the first step toward high seas self-supervision. On one hand,
the United States will probably welcome such ROC initiative to share
the responsibilities. On another hand, the ROC in a joint-monitor setup, will elevate her position to more of an equal with the United
States.
The 1989 agreement placed many responsibilities on an ill-prepared ROC government. In the 1989 negotiation, the ROC appeared
to have neglected many options, some of which the author has just
proposed. Were there factors which hindered the ROC's negotiation
111. Tsai Chien-ta, United States Fishery Policy Development and Management, supro ,
note 57, p. 4.
112. Geoffrey Waugh, ''Tuna Wars," Pacific Islanders Monthly, (December 1988), p. 46.
113. Interview with Mr. Tung Ih-Hsiu, Senior Specialist, The Institute of Fishery Biology, August 29, 1989.
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efforts? Similar to the lobbying pressure faced by the U.S. negotiators,
the ROC negotiators were themselves under different domestic pressures. The next section, section four, seeks to answer the queStion,
why did the ROC not try harder in the negotiation? The section first
looks at the ROC's negotiation positions and the underlying concerns
leading to these positions. It then analyzes factors within the negotiation context, which hindered the ROC's negotiation effort. Finally,
The section concludes the overall investigation with a study of the
linkage factors, which affected the negotiation process.
Section IV: ROC's Poor Performance, Why?
In theory the ROC could establish her own negotiation agenda
and expand the scope of the negotiations. International negotiations,
however, frequently do not produce self-benefitting outcomes. There
exists a wide range of factors from linkage to bureaucratic competition
that can greatly limit the options available to the negotiators. The
1989 AIT-CCNAA fisheries negotiations resulted in an agreement
that infringed upon ROC's economic interests in the North Pacific and
undermined her sovereign fishing rights in international waters. This
agreement was a great disappointment to the general public in the
ROC, which perceived the outcome as a defeat in the government's
diplomatic efforts. What happened at these fisheries talks? What factors influenced the ROC's negotiation expectations? Were there obstacles which hindered the ROC's negotiation efforts? Although the
negotiations took place behind closed doors and much of the details
remained confidential, it is possible to draw reasonable conclusions
about the ROC negotiation attitudes and expectations from the available media information, government reports, and interviews.
This section seeks to address these questions in three stages. First,
the section discusses and analyzes the ROC's negotiation position
throughout the 1989 fisheries talks. It identifies three immediate concerns which shaped the ROC's negotiation position: the will to protect
her economic interests, the fear of a driftnet ban, and the desire to
preserve her high seas sovereignty. The second stage analyzes factors
which prevented the ROC from negotiating creatively and aggressively. These factors include the absence of an appropriate negotiation
strategy, bureaucratic noncoordination, and domestic pressure. Finally, the section examines the 1989 fisheries talks within the context
of ROC's foreign relations, investigating possible linkage factors in the
negotiations. The study determines that in addition to the immediate
fisheries issues, the concern over U.S.ROC relations and the desire to
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project a favorable international image further motivated the ROC to
sign the agreement.
·
The United States initiated the talks on the North Pacific driftnet
fishery. The United States, however, had no other interest in the
marine resources of the North Pacific high seas, aside from salmon.
Moreover, although the environmental impact of driftnetting was a
topic of interest, the U.S. government's agitation with the technology
actually stemmed from its frustration over the problem of salmon
poaching in the area. In negotiations with the United States, the ROC
clearly realized the significance of the salmon industry to the United
States. Since 1983, the United States, has regularly discussed the
poaching problem with the ROC. 114 In the 1989 negotiations, the
ROC was not primarily concerned with her right to catch salmon.
Rather, for the ROC the negotiations created a dilemma over the relative importance of economic gains as opposed to national pride. Economically she was concerned with her fishery exports to the United
States and with her North Pacific squid fishery. As for national pride,
the ROC was most stubborn in resisting high seas boarding and inspection. The ROC's apparent uncertainty and hesitation throughout
the negotiations were the result of this internal dilemma.
The ROC's Negotiation Stands
In 1989 the ROC and the United States carried out three rounds
of fishery consultations; beginning in early February and concluding in
late June. In the first round of negotiations, the ROC had high expectations. Sensitive to her economic interests, the ROC wanted to reserve the right to operate freely in the North Pacific and avoid aU.§.
trade sanction on fishery goods. Fearing an eventual ban on driftnetting, the ROC declined the U.S. request to send U.S. scientific observers on ROC fishing vessels to study the driftnet technology. The ROC
also rejected the American demand for high seas boarding and inspection on the principle of her tlag-state sovereignty on the high seas.
Due to the last disagreement, the ROC broke-off the first round of
negotiations. During the second round of negotiations, the ROC compromised her expectations and agreed to a U.S. observer program. lin
exchange, however, she wanted to expand her fishery in the North
Pacific. The second round faltered as the ROC refused again to allow
U.S. boarding on the high seas. In the third and the final round of
consultations, the ROC became extremely anxious. While aU.§. fish114. "Cbih-Yang No. 1, High Seas Fishing and the US-ROC Fisheries Negotiation,"
Chong-hwa yu-ye (China Fisheries News), June 5, 1989, section 4.
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ery embargo on the ROC overshadowed the meetings, the stalemate
over high seas boarding persisted. After ten days of contemplation,
the ROC reluctantly agreed to the draft. Of the original expectations,
the ROC reserved the right to driftnet in the North Pacific, though
with further restrictions, and escaped the financial backlash of a U.S.
fishery embargo. The ROC agreed, however, to high seas boarding
and established a U.S. observer program. Thus, the ROC was able to
protect her economic interests, but failed to preserve her "national
dignity."115
Economic Concerns

The threat of a U.S. embargo was compelling. In 1988 the ROC
exported more than $320 million worth of fishery products to the
United States. 116 This export value constituted twenty five percent of
the country's overall fishery export for 1988.U 7 The squid catch was
the most important marine fish harvest in the country. In terms of
catch tonnage, the squid catch constituted seventeen percent of the
overall fishery harvest in 1988. In that year the North Pacific fishery
produced 30,000 metric tons of squid or thirteen percent of the overall
squid catch. 118 At $1.60 per kilogram, the North Pacific squid fishery
produced around $48 million's worth of squid. 119 From a purely economic standpoint, the ROC government was unwilling to sacrifice
$320 million worth of exports for the preservation of a $48 million
fishery. The ROC was, nonetheless, also unwilling to give up a rich
fishing ground on the high seas over which the United States, in theory, had no jurisdiction. The North Pacific fishery was an expanding
fishery which the ROC had operated profitably for almost a decade.
She simply wanted to preserve the fruits of her labor. Under the
threat of an embargo, the the ROC was ready to negotiate for an accord. She also, however, desired an accord that would allow her to
driftnet as freely as possible on the high seas.
115. Ibid., section 4.
116. Clyde Farnsworth,Taiwan to Let U.S. Monitor Drift-Net Fishing Practices, supra,
note 55, p. Dl.
117. Taiwan Fisheries Bureau, Department of Agriculture and Forestry, Provincial
Government of Taiwan, Fisheries Yearbook-Taiwan Area 1988, Taipei, Taiwan, May, 1989,
p. 8.

118. Ku Bi-ting, "Where Can the Driftnet Industry Go?,"Shi-pao chou-k'an (China
Times Weekly), No. 299, July 15-21, 1989, p. 57.
119. "Hope, Dilemma, Disappointment... ," Chong-hwa yu-ye (China Fisheries News),
June 5, 1989, section 4.
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Fear of a Driftnet Ban
The United States had expressed the desire to ban driftnetting
and boycott driftnetted catch. The ROC was also aware of the congressional efforts to legislate bans on the technology. The ROC feared
that any observer program might be the first step toward a total ban
on driftnetting. With driftnet operations in the South Pacific, North
Pacific, and the Indian Ocean, the ROC valued her driftnet industry
highly and was reluctant to allow U.S. scientific observers aboard. 120
In 1988 Australia had already ejected 40 ROC driftnet vessels from
her EEZ. 121 This recent experience has made the ROC fishery officials
quite wary of the driftnet issue. the ROC was consequently somewhat
hesitant in the talks with the United States, and at least initially, uncooperative. The ROC perceived the proposed observer program as
threat to the future of her driftnet industry. The Australian ejection
made the ROC feel extremely vulnerable. The refusal of a U.S. observer program thus stemmed from these insecurities.
High Sea Sovereignty

The issue of high seas boarding and inspection was as important
as the ROC's economic interests in the fisheries talks. When the ROC
entered the negotiations, she was resolutely against high seas boarding
and inspection. From the very beginning, Council of Agriculture officials had repeatedly stressed ROC's "jurisdictional rights" on the high
seas. The officials claimed, " Fishing vessels on the high seas are extensions of a nation's territory. It, therefore, is unthinkable to allow
U.S. boarding on the high seas." 122 Although many other countries,
such as Iceland and the People's Republic of China, have all agreed to
U.S. high seas boarding in exchange for the right to fish in the U.S.
EEZ, the ROC was unusually adamant in her resistance to U.S. high
sea boarding. 123
The ROC's recalcitrance was most probably a result of her insecurity over her diplomatic isolation. Embroiled in the "two Chinas"
question, the ROC is recognized by only twenty six nation-states. 124
120. Kuo Tsong-hai, A Study of the Nation's Driftnet Industry, supra, note 12, pp. 1-5.
121. Daniel Keith Conner and Robert O'Dell, ''The Tightening Net of Marine Plastic
Pollution," Environment, Vol. 30, (January/February, 1988), p. 21.
122. Chou Hsing-hsuen, What did the Nationalist Government Achieve?, supra, note 104,
p. 56.
123. American Institute in Taiwan," U.S. International Fisheries Agreements: Boarding
and Inspection Practices," Cultural and Information Section, Taipei, Taiwan, August 4,
1989, p. 2.
124. "We Try Harder," The Economist, Vol. 313, No. 7625, (October. 21,1989), p. 34.
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Regaining international recognition has become a major ROC foreign
policy objective because of this diplomatic isolation. Sensitive to her
precarious position in the global community, the ROC places a higher
premium on her symbolic sovereignty than most other countries.
In the negotiations, the ROC's need to uphold her "national dignity" reflected her insistence upon asserting her de jure right as a sovereign state. The ROC's lack of de jure acceptance in the global
community simply made the symbolic high seas jurisdiction even more
important to her, such that she was almost willing to risk a $320 million trade sanction.
Factors Which Hindered the ROC Efforts
The ROC's negotiators formulated firm objectives, but the negotiating team was unprepared and uncoordinated. The ROC had objectives, but she did not devise means to reach them. Her failure to
negotiate coherently and flexibly with the United States was the result
of problems on three levels: strategic, bureaucratic, and domestic. In
term of strategic problems, the ROC lacked a coherent plan to counter
the U.S. proposals. She followed the Japanese negotiation strategy
without considering the suitability of adopting such a strategy. In
terms of bureaucratic problems, the ROC negotiators did not have the
autonomy it needed. The Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MOFA) presided over the negotiation team and constricted its negotiation capabilities. Finally, the ROC government cocooned herself when she
overpublicized the sovereignty issue to the public. The resulting domestic pressure in the ROC prompted her to remain resolute on the
boarding issue, and constrained her maneuverability in the
negotiations.
Inflexible Negotiation Strategy
Throughout most of the negotiation process the ROC's attitude
seemed to be one of insecurity. She was insecure about her sovereign
status and about U.S. intervention in her high sea fisheries. Likewise,
the ROC's negotiation strategy was also uncertain and passive. The
ROC's main negotiation strategy was to follow the Japanese lead and
watch the South Koreans. In February 1989, for instance, the three
countries agreed to self-monitorship, rejecting a U.S. proposal to send
American observers aboard the squid vessels. When Japan agreed to
allow 32 U.S. and Canadian observers on her vessels, however, the
ROC began to waver. 12s The ROC's rationalization was that if Japan,
125. "Chih-Yang No.I, High Seas Fishing," supra, note 114, section 4.
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the fishery leader, could agree to such an arrangement, the ROC must
also. The "follow the leader" strategy proved costly in this round of
fisheries talks with the United States.
Adopting positions similar to those of Japan may not have been
wise. Although both the ROC and Japan shared a common interest in
the squid fishery, they did not share the same kind of relationship with
the United States, nor did they share similar domestic conditions and
fisheries backgrounds. The ROC should study the Japanese negotiation efforts, but she, should not adopt Japanese negotiation positions.
For instance, the ROC should not have adopted Japan's position,
stressing that driftnetting has not been proven scientifically unsound.
Japan made this claim eloquently because she substantiated the argument with her preliminary research results. 126 The ROC's similar
claim, however, appeared unconvincing because she had not made any
effort to study the environmental impact of the technology.
In adhering to a Japanese negotiation position, the ROC failed to
explore other negotiation possibilities. When Japan yielded to a tough
U.S. negotiation team on June 16, for example, the ROC was pressured to do the same. The ROC should have developed her own negotiation positions and strategy to suit her particular needs. Trying to
employ an inappropriate strategy greatly hindered the ROC effort at
the negotiation table. The ROC's passivity and uncertainty throughout the negotiations stemmed partly from deferring to the Japanese
strategy.

Bureaucratic Noncoordination
The ROC negotiation team consisted mainly of members from
the Council of Agriculture (COA). The COA, however, did not have
the complete authority in the decisionmaking process. To a great extent, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MOFA), though not a key participant at the negotiation table, authorized the negotiation
decisions. 127 Without full authority, the ROC negotiators were unable to negotiate freely at the table. The bureaucratic structure thus
thwarted the ROC negotiation efforts.
The MOFA is a cabinet-level agency. The COA is also an agency
with sub-cabinet status within the Executive branch of the government. With the ROC's rapid industrialization, however, the role of
126. Chou Hsing-hsuen, "Facing International Pressure, the Government Should Take
Action to Solve the Problem," Chong-kuo shih- pao (China Times), June 30, 1989, p. 6.
127. Ku Bi-ting, "Unequal Footing," Shih-pao chou-k'an, ( China Times Weekly), No.
229 (July 15-21), 1989, p. 23.
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agriculture has declined in the nation's economy. In contrast, as the
ROC's ties with the United States become increasingly strained under
mounting trade frictions, the role of the MOFA has concurrently increased in its importance. Furthermore, the MOFA, actively involved
in most of ROC's international talks, especially trade negotiations
with the United States, has broader jurisdiction than the COA. The
COA, thus, was obligated to compromise its authority with the
MOFA. In the 1989 fisheries talks, the COA negotiators, in effect,
negotiated with tied hands. According to Chiu Mao-ying, the ROC
chief negotiator in the 1989 fisheries talks ,"Issues beyond the negotiation team jurisdiction was deferred to the MOFA and settled via diplomatic channels." 128 Mr. Chiu failed to clarify what the&e "issues"
were. It is clear, however, that the negotiation team had limited authority and very likely could not negotiate as freely as it otherwise
could have negotiated. As a result the team appeared passive and
uncertain.

Domestic Pressures
The ROC maintained a tough stand on the issue of high seas
boarding and inspection. When deciding between economic interests
and high seas sovereignty, however, the ROC chose economic interests. The ROC realized that she could not obtain the best of both
worlds, yet, she did not compromise till the very end. One of the major factors in the ROC's inflexibility on the high seas boarding issue
was clearly domestic pressure. The ROC government proudly declared at the beginning of the negotiations that she was determined to
stand tough against U.S. high seas boarding in order to protect her
"national dignity." The public in the ROC supported this stand enthusiastically. When the government began to waver on the issue,
however, the various press headlines, such as "We Should Fight on
Legal Basis: Don't Fear," and "Taiwan Definitely Eaten by Yankees,"
reflected the intense public pressure on the negotiators to stay resolute
on the sovereignty issue. 129 Under such pressure, it thus became
rather difficult for the ROC's negotiators to back down from their previous statement when the talks reached a stalemate. Moreover, the
ROC government was reluctant to disappoint the public just three
months before the nation's first multi-party election. The strength of
the opposition party has sensitized the ruling party to its image with
· 128. "Visitation?Verification?Inspection?," Shih-pao chou-k'an. (China Times Weekly),
No. 299, July 15-21, 1989, p. 53.
129. American Institute in Taiwan, Cultural and Information Section, Media Summary,
July 14-August 15, 1989, Taipei, Taiwan, August 11, 1989. p. 2.
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the public. Giving up its sovereign high seas rights could have marred
the government's image and reduced its popularity. Under these factors, the ROC was forced to remain inflexible on the sovereignty issue.
The ROC publicized the 'national dignity• issue to the extreme,
and failed to live up to her promises in the end. The ROC government
did not want to lose face in ceding its high sea rights, and betray the
public trust in the process. The high seas stalemate resulted thus
largely from these pressures.
Linkage Factors
The ROC almost broke-off the 1989 negotiations. She signed the
agreement at the last minute not because it was an agreeable accord,
but because the consequences of nc>t signing might be disastrous. The
COA chief negotiator, Chiu Mao-ying, stressed that, "the accord was
signed with the country's overall benefits in mind." 130 The vagueness
of the term "overall benefit" suggested linkage factors. The ROC media, in fact, has hinted that the negotiation was actually more complicated than they appeared.
Throughout the fisheries talks, two outside factors shadowed the
discussions, escalating international pressure and the U.S.-ROC relations. These two factors may have further restricted the ROC negotiation team's ability to negotiate and forced the team to sign on an
agreement which it did not truly support.
International Image
Aside from the U.S. condemnation, the ROC's driftnet fleet was
under attack around the globe. The sixteen countries of the South
Pacific Forum issued the Tarawa Declaration in June, which demanded that the ROC tuna driftnet fleet stop its operations in the
South Pacific. 131 In 1988, the Soviet Union arrested three ROC squid
vessels for poaching Soviet-origin salmon. 132 The Japanese salmon industry also assisted the United States in investigating ROC's poaching. 133 These countries have individually exerted pressure on the ROC
to control her fishery operations. In addition, these countries have all
130. Ku Bi-1ing, "Unequal Footing," supra , note 127, p. 66.
131. David Clark Scott, "15 Nations Seek Ban on Drift Nets," Los Angeles Times. July
30, 1989, part I, p. 13.
132. Magnuson Fishery Conservation and Management Act of 1976-Reauth. Part II,
supra, note 36, p. 109.
133. Magnuson Fishery Conservation and Management Act of 1976-Reauth. Part II,
supra, note 36, p. 114.
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assisted the United States in gathering evidence against the ROC's
driftnetting and poaching.
At a time when the ROC was eager to play a more active role in
the international arena, these various problems clearly hindered her
policy initiatives. On the one hand, of the twenty six nation-states
who still recognized the ROC, many were located in the South Pacific.
On the other hand, in February 1989 the first ROC trade mission arrived in Moscow to establish economic ties. The driftnet dispute undermined the ROC's diplomatic efforts in the South Pacific, and
salmon poaching hampered her economic courtship of the Soviet
Union.
International pressure weakened the ROC stand in the negotiations. The ROC, insecure over her sovereignty yet eager to play a
more active role in the international arena, has grown more aware of
her international image. The international opposition against the use
of the driftnet has portrayed the ROC as a environmental polluter,
and she was reluctant to allow the event from harming her public relations with other countries. After all, the ROC under the name "Taiwan, Penghu, Kinman and Matsu Customs Territory" has pursued a
possible GATT membership and has expressed interest in joining
OECD. 134 The driftnet dispute will not help her cause. Signing the
agreement with the United States would reflect ROC interest in conserving global resources and help dispel her image as an irresponsible
profiteer. The international anti-driftnet movement consequently
placed further pressure on the ROC to sign the agreement with the
United States.
The U.S.-ROC Relation
The following excerpts are from the New York based China
Times Weekly 7/15-21, 1989 Special Report "Unequal Footing." 135
A COA official, also a negotiation representative, tears
in his eyes, spoke chokingly "At the time, I was not the only
one in tears."
Another representative in an oversea call said "It was
the pressure from the Ministry of Foreign Affairs(MOFA),
otherwise, it would not have been so bad."
Another representative expressed "If the public criticizes us, we can only bear the blame. Because we do not
have the decision making authority the pressure from 'that
134. ''The Other China is Starting to Soar,'' Business Week, (November 6, 1989), p. 62.
135. Ku Bi-ling, "Unequal Footing," supra, note 127, p. 66.
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side' was simply too great. If fisheries talks are linked absolutely to U.S.-ROC relations, is there room for negotiation?"
From these excerpts, it appears that the MOFA pressured the
COA negotiation team into signing the agreement in the interest of
U.S.-ROC relations. Although top officials in the COA repeatedly denied that the MOFA was ever directly involved, the importance of
U.S.-ROC relations in the ROC foreign relations makes this linkage
quite probable. The ROC was dedicated to her long-standing friendship with the United States, and she was also concerned with her various trade problems with the United States. The 1989 fisheries talks
were carried out within the context of this relationship.
Since the Nationalist government fled mainland China in 1949,
the United States has been the ROC's most important protector and
partner. The United States sells millions of dollars of arms to the
ROC annually and presently receives thirty percent of the ROC's exports. 136 Any breach in relations between the two countries could
harm ROC's security and economy. Sensitive to this tie, the ROC has
built a lobbying operation that is comparable in size and financing to
those operated by Israel and Japan. 137 In the 1989 negotiations, the
ROC was unwilling to harm this carefully nurtured relationship for a
$48 million squid fishery or for a symbolic exercise of sovereignty.
Despite the ROC's courtship of the United States, trade frictions
have recently strained the two countries' relationship. Since 1980 the
ROC has carried a trade deficit with the United States. In 1989 this
deficit was $12 billion, a 15.1 percent increase from the previous
year. 138 As a result, the U.S. trade representatives are constantly
"raising hell" in Taipei. 139 Following the fisheries talks in June 1989,
the two countries negotiated on intellectual property in September and
agricultural products in October. With so many negotiations pending,
the ROC did not want the fisheries talks to jeopardize her chances at
these later negotiations. She thus felt the need to appease to the
United States at the fisheries talks to ensure a more favorable atmosphere later on. The overall state of U.S.-ROC relations and the two
countries' trade disputes made the fisheries talks an expendable "bargaining chip." The MOFA consequently urged the ROC negotiators
to accept the accord unconditionally.
136. "Annoying Big Brother,'' The Economist, Vol. 314, No. 7637, (January 13, 1989),
p. 68.

137. James McGregor, "Taiwan Cultivates U.S. Support with Lobbying Force the Size
of Israel,'' The Wall Street Joumal, November 7, 1989, p. A24.
138. "Annoying Big Brother, "supra, note 136, p. 68.
139. "Annoying Big Brother," supra, note 136, p. 68.
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By the end of 1989 the United States had signed separate bilateral
agreements with Japan, the ROC, and South Korea. All three agreements were of similar content. Relatively speaking, therefore, the
ROC did not, thus, necessarily perform badly. 140 With both Japan and
South Korea faltering, it is questionable whether the ROC could have
negotiated a better accord(see Chart 1). One thing however is certain.
The ROC government lost public faith and fomented domestic dissatisfaction on the high seas boarding debate. In both Japan and South
Korea by contrast, the dilemma of high seas boarding was not a major
issue. The ROC negotiators essentially overstressed the jurisdictional
issue, which became a quagmire in the debate. The general public in
the ROC, supporting the government's stand, felt victimized by the
Americans and betrayed by its government's lofty promises. The
ROC government could have avoided such controversy had it maintained a lower posture. If the government had not stressed and publicized the jurisdictional issue so enthusiastically, the accord probably
could have been signed without seriously undermining the government's reputation. With increased public participation in her government's policymaking and increased activity in the international arena,
the ROC must engineer a new approach to her diplomacy. For the
ROC's future negotiations, the next section looks at the possibility of
track two diplomacy, involving non- government, non-official, informal discussion among the negotiating parties. This type of diplomacy
could have improved ROC's negotiation efforts in the 1989 fisheries
talks. It can also enhance ROC's negotiation efforts generally.
Section V: Track Two Diplomacy and the ROC
Most people are familiar with track one diplomacy. It is government to government, official, formal interaction between instructed
representatives of sovereign states. Track two diplomacy, less in the
limelight, is non-governmental, informal, and unofficial in nature.
Track two consists of interaction between private citizens or groups of
people within a country or from different countries who are outside
the formal governmental power structure. Track two diplomacy is not
a substitute for track one, but may be used to support or parallel it. 141
Track two diplomacy, in supplementing track one, provides additional options to track one and presents another arena for less-con140. North Pacific Driftnet Regulations, Alaska Department of Fish and Game, Juneau,
Alaska, October 1989.
141. John W. McDonald Jr.and Diane, B. Bendahmane, eds., Conflict Resolution: Track
Two Diplomacy, Foreign Service Institute, U.S. Department of State, Washington, D.C., p.
1.
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strained discussions. On one hand, the objective of international track
two diplomacy is the reduction or resolution of conflict among the
countries by lowering the anger or fear that exists, through improved
communication and better understanding of each other's perspectives.
On the other hand, it is designed to assist official leaders by compensating for the constraints imposed on them by the psychological need
to appear strong and indomitable in the face of opponents. The informal and unofficial nature of track two diplomacy permits conflict
management without public pressure. The relatively relaxed atmosphere of track two allows participants to talk more frankly and be
more accommodating to each other's views. This type of diplomacy
is, therefore, most useful when track one can not be negotiated freely
due to public scrutiny, or if track one reaches an inextricable ideological stalemate.
Track two diplomacy is usually carried out in two to three independent stages. The first stage is to facilitate problem solving workshops or seminars among the negotiation parties. The workshop
encourages discussion and brain-storming among the participants in
hope of finding new approaches to track one negotiation. Stage two
involves influencing the public opinion. In this stage, the negotiating
parties try to influence public opinion, hoping to reduce the sense of
being victimized of the parties and rehumanizing the image of the adversary. The goal is, thus, to calm the public emotions, which may
place serious constraints on the track one negotiation process. Stage
three and the final stage is the establishment of economic cooperative
programs, and does not necessarily occur in all track two diplomacies.
The establishment of cooperative economic programs provides incentive, institutions, support, and continuity to stage one and two. Cooperative programs, essentially, enhance any dialogue that might have
been established in the previous talks and keeps up the informal, yet
frank communication channels. One can see that track two diplomacy
does not resolve the dispute or the problem. Only track one is responsible for the official conflict resolution. Track two seeks only to provide alternative options, nurture a more conducive environment, and
create and continue a more open dialogue among the parties
involved. 142
The ROC is a de facto state without the de jure status in countries
not recognizing it. Even with friendly countries such as the United
States, the ROC often lacks the diplomatic recognition necessary for
successful negotiations. With many of her disputes, the ROC is fre142. Ibid., pp. 5-15.
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quently forced to resolve the problems via unofficial and non-diplomatic channels. The ROC's situation is rather unique. She can not
use track one diplomacy because her nonrecognition has restricted the
use of this channel Instead, the ROC has to skirt this problem and
resort to its non-official diplomatic missions. The CCNAA, for instance, is a non-governmental organization, yet staffed with government payrolled personnel The Association for East Asian Relations,
on the other hand, is the ROC's de facto mission in Japan staffed by
both the private sector and the government. 143 For the ROC therefore, track two diplomacy stands out as a valuable option for her. It
may be the most important means of substantive diplomacy.
The ROC has been and continues to be active in the area of international trade, finance, and development. As the world's 13th largest
trading nation, and with the world's second biggest foreign reserve,
the ROC's foreign relations are basically economic relations. 144 Because the private sector plays a dominant role in these international
transactions, it is possible for the the ROC government to utilize the
private sector as a channel for communication and negotiation. The
ROC's diplomacy could become extremely effective through wellstrategized track two diplomacy. The government could institutionalize track two diplomacy and establish such channels to reinforce track
one's short-comings. Japan's powerful conglomerates, such as Mitsubishi and Mitsui, have, for example, established extensive international networks around the globe. These Japanese corporations have
often acted as liaisons for the Japanese government abroad and provided many forums for discussion. The ROC's private sector, albeit
different from Japan's, still has extensive ties abroad. The ROC government should begin to take advantage of her strong private sector.
Track two diplomacy for the ROC should become a necessary
part of her international and domestic relations. Internationally, the
ROC has expressed interest in rejoining international organizations
and establishing diplomatic ties. In adopting "flexible diplomacy,"
and using her $74 billion foreign reserve, the ROC recently has returned to the Asian Development Bank under the name "Taipei,
China" and established diplomatic ties with Liberia, Barbados, Belize,
and Grenada} 45 Domestically, the lifting of Martial Law in 1987
drastically changed the political dynamics of the country. The lifting
of Martial Law allowed the development of opposition parties, the
143. Chiu Hungdah, ed., Chinese Yearbook of International Law and Affairs, Baltimore,
Maryland: Chinese Society of International Law, Vol. 8, ( 1988-89) p. 553.
144. ''The Other China is Starting to Soar," supra, note 134, p. 61.
145. "We Try Harder," supra , note 124, pp. 33-34.
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freedom to protest and strike, and freedom of the press. 146 The traditionally "iron-fisted" central government suddenly found itself involved in conflicts with a politically eager public. Government
decisions are now under the close scrutiny of the opposition parties
and the public. The people hold the government accountable and
voice their concerns undaunted. This dynamic yet somewhat chaotic
domestic situation has had significant impact on the ROC's foreign
policymaking also. No longer can the government formulate foreign
policies without public acknowledgment and input. Facing the new
domestic environment and eager to carry out new initiatives in the
international arena, the ROC has to find ways of harnessing this public energy and find new approaches to her diplomacy. Track two diplomacy can fulfill these goals, domestically and internationally. It is
a means of establishing communication channels to reduce tensions
and find agreeable innovative resolutions to problems. The ROC government can utilize track two fully to enhance its decision-making capabilities in relation to domestic interest and to further its
international efforts in gaining recognition.
The 1989 AIT-CCNAA fisheries negotiations illustrated the
problems and dilemma in track one diplomacy. During this negotiation, the key point of conflict was the issue of high seas boarding and
inspection. The two countries reached a stalemate early on and failed
to explore other possibilities to the agreement. The ROC government
was resolute on preserving her sovereign rights. The United States
was also resolute in preserving her marine resources. In this situation,
track two diplomacy may be useful. The ROC might have used track
two consultations both domestically and bilaterally with the United
States to remove some of the track one obstacles. Thorough domestic
consultations can help the negotiators formulate a better strategy. Private consultations with U.S. fishing interests can help reduce the tension and anger felt on all sides.
The ROC exported $320 million worth of fishery goods to the
United States in 1988. Of this amount, around $100 million were tuna
exports. 147 The two countries, thus, shared fishery interests, especially in the tuna industry. The adversarial atmosphere of the 1989
negotiation hindered the negotiation process and, in the end, strained
U.S.-ROC relations. Facing this problem, efforts on the track two
level involving the fishing industries of both countries, environmental146. "The Bare Facts," The Economist, Vol. 313, No. 7628, (November 18,1989), p.37.
147. Interview with Mr. Chu Ming, Chairman of the Taiwan Tuna Association, Taipei,
Taiwan, August 10, 1989.
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ists and other fishery scholars could have smoothed the way for a fishery accord.
With the 1989 negotiation, domestic consultation with the fishing
industry in the ROC did not really begin until after the February
round of the negotiation. The ROC media, with its newly founded
freedom of press, also began lavish front page articl~ on the consultation process. Mr. Wu Tien-luan, assistant editor of the China Fishery
News, criticized the government in that " ... [i]t did not prepare well
to go into the negotiation and failed to consult with all sectors of the
industry." 148 Mr. Chu-Ming of the Taiwan Tuna Association criticized the media, on the other hand, for " ... helping the Americans by
making high seas boarding such a major issue, evoking unnecessary
emotions in the country." 149 Due to the lifting of martial law in 1987,
the ROC government's decision-making can no longer be isolated
from public opinion. In the 1989 negotiations, the salmon/driftnet issue evolved from a commercial dispute into a political stalemate. The
media further enfiamed the domestic emotions by stressing the loss of
sovereignty in permitting U.S. boarding. If the ROC government had
utilized track two consultations, however, the issue might have remained a commercial issue and evoked less media sensationalism and
public emotions.
What would a track two scenario look like for the 1989 U.S.ROC fishery talks? A rough sketch of this possibility is outlined
below:
Domestically, the ROC government should establish communication channels among all interested parties in before the negotiations in
the following order: 1) Joint conferences between the government and
the fishing industry behind closed doors; 2) Open forum between the
government, the industry, the media and academia; and 3) Form a
special task force with members from the COA and the fishing industry to monitor the negotiations.
The joint conference would be designed to allow frank discussions
between the industry and the government. In the conference, the participants should not only try to establish the negotiation position, but
also prioritize objectives to allow room for compromise. The meeting
would be confidential to allow more open exchanges. The open forum
is an information session, but also a workshop for brain-storming opportunities. The primary goals would be to find new approaches to the
148. Interview with Mr. Wu Tien-1uan, Assistant Editor of the China Fisheries News,
Taipei, Taiwan, August 23, 1989.
149. Interview with Mr. Chu Ming, supra, note 147.
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fishery talks and eliminate any public misunderstandings. The special
task force would continue the established domestic discussions and advise the negotiators throughout the actual negotiation process. This
task force should remain autonomous from the government's bureaucratic structure and have the option to assist the negotiators directly.
The domestic track two preparations can help the ROC to formulate a
more coherent strategy and lessen the m¢ia clamor. The ROC negotiators, through this series of planning and discussion, can grow more
assertive and aggressive in the fishery talks.
Internationally, track two is carried out on three fronts: 1)
CCNAA to lobby with its available resources in the congress,.2) to
facilitate communication between the ROC fishing industry and the
U.S. salmon interest with the U.S. tuna industry as the mediator, and
3) to hold fishery conferences in both the ROC and the northwest
United States to facilitate understanding between the fishery interests
from both countries
The CCNAA's lobbying organs in the United States rival that of
Israel and Japan. With this round of negotiation, CCNAA really
should use its power-brokers or lobbyists to pacify the emotions of the
Northwest. The U.S. Congress is susceptible to lobbying. The ROC
should use her grass-roots lobbying power to sway congressional opinions. The tuna industry lobbied for the ROC during the 1989 negotiation. However, the industry could play a key mediating role between
the U.S. salmon interest and the ROC squid fleet. Meetings between
the Chinese from Taiwan and the Americans allow direct discussions
and open up the possibilities for compromise. The North Pacific fishery dispute was a commercial and environmental issue. A meeting
between just the fishing industries skirts the extraneous political considerations. Finally, conferences and visits on both sides of the Pacific
can really help the fishing industries understand the severity of the
problem. When the ROC fishery business sees the salmon hatcheries,
it will realize the American efforts in preserving salmon stock. When
the American salmon interest sees the chaotic harbors in the ROC, it
may also understand the ROC problem of regulation and management. With this kind of visual and verbal communication, both sides
may be persuaded to amend individual positions to compromise their
demands.
Track two diplomacy can make a difference in the negotiation.
The ROC, through track two, can consolidate domestic efforts and
reduce tensions with the United States. With track two, the ROC is
certain to negotiate a more equitable agreement for herself.
The North Pacific fishery dispute exemplifies, to a certain extent,
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general structural problems in the ROC's fishing industry, mainly its
lack of regulation and outdated government fishery policies. The
1989 U.S.- ROC fishing negotiation reflected some of the continual
weaknesses in the ROC's negotiation position, specifically, her diplomatic isolation and her self- insecurity. Track two diplomacy would
have been useful in the 1989 fishery talks. However, the general concept of track two diplomacy can really be applied to the ROC international relations as a whole. The ROC has long been dissatisfied with
her international status. Although considered a strong economic
power, the ROC has received second class treatment around the
world. In the United States, the ROC diplomats are not allowed to
enter the State Department or the White House. 150 In Europe, the
Europeans treat the ROC diplomats with indifference. For the ROC,
her de jure status does not at all reflect her de facto role and contribution to the global community. Without the means to play track one
diplomacy, the ROC should apply track two diplomacy whenever possible and may even, at times, give track two priority over track one.
With the United States, the ROC has already practiced track two
diplomacy to a certain extent. Instead of building friendships in the
White House or the State Department, the ROC has turned to senators and congressmen, state legislators, mayors, journalists, and corporate chiefs. This grass-roots strategy has resulted in, for example,
eighteen states having trade offices in the ROC and 138 cooperative
programs with U.S. universities. 151 Although the ROC has been successful in this aspect, the government still carries out most of these
track two initiatives. These courtships are, therefore, still official government operations with its bureaucratic constraints. The ROC, with
its booming economy and flourishing entrepreneurial class, could began to encourage the private sector to take on the track two initiatives.
This strategy will allow more diplomatic flexibility and establish even
more communication channels for the government.
The time is ripe for a major push for track two diplomacy in the
ROC. This, in fact, may apply to Asian Newly Industrialized Countries (NICs) in general. With their booming economies, these countries, though small, are powerful economic engines and can exert
global influence with their economic successes. For the ROC, the
move toward globalization is even more pronounced. Her private sector, since 1987, has begun to invest extensively overseas and begun to
150. James McGregor, "Taiwan Cultivates America's Support," supra, note 137, p.
A24.
151. James McGregor, ''Taiwan Cultivates America's Support," supra, note 137, p.
A24.
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globalize its strategies. The world is beginning to realize the strength
of these the ROC businesses. The Evergreen Corporation, Acer Computers and Mitac International are just a few of the ROC's leading
multinationals. In 1989, the ROC private sector and the government
tabled a plan to establish fifty to one hundred ROC global brands. 152
While the government help the private sector globalize, it can also
work with the private sector in setting up channels for track two diplomacy. The ROC can and should use the strength of her private sector
to compensate for her diplomatic weaknesses. Track two diplomacy
can enhance the ROC's international de facto standing and further her
efforts in raising her de jure status.
Conclusion

The 1982 United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea
(LOS Convention) skirted the resource allocation dilemma by 'privatizing' the coastal seas. Recalling that these coastal EEZ's contained
around ninety percent of the global marine resources, it is not difficult
to imagine the sudden resource shortage many distant water fleets now
face. 153 Although the LOS Convention encouraged coastal nations to
share their marine resources with other nations, such idealism remained only valid on paper. Furthermore even with EEZ's, resource
disputes persisted. The long-standing U.S.-Canada fishing dispute
over the resources of the St. George's Bank, for instance, has resulted
in the Canadian Coast Guards firing on U.S. fishing vessels. 154 The
high seas boarding of the U.S. Coast Guard on the ROC squid vessels
is an example of yet another dispute over resources. Nations are competing for the available marine resources. The global common, free
and inexhaustible, is now a fairy tale from the past.
International disputes over fishing rights are common. Many
countries ignore international law in face of profit. The United States
condemned the the ROC fishermen for intercepting salmon on the
high seas. However, just two years ago, the Kingdom of Kiribati in
the South Pacific similarly detained several U.S. tuna vessels for fishing violations in her EEZ. Rather than abiding by international law
and paying the fine, the United States, in retaliation, cut all aid to
Kiribati. 155 International law of the Sea was designed to maintain
152. "A Brand by Any Other Name is not as Sweet," Sinorama, (November 1989), p.
14.
153. Hsieh Ta-wen, New Sea Order and International Fishery Management, supra, note
5, p. 46.
154. Cable News Network, "Headline News," Atlanta, July 29, 1989.
155. "Fisheries in Crisis," Pacific Islands Monthly, (December 1988), p. 44.
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some sort of order in the ocean common. Unfortunately, nations often
use the law as a "Law of Convenience." The United States quoted
from the law when the ROC poached salmon. When U.S. fishermen
violated the laws, however, the United States conveniently ignored the
law. International negotiation on the basis of international law is really a power game. The stronger nation often prevails over the weaker
nation regardless of validity of the law. Thus, when negotiating with a
stronger opponent, the weaker nation should prepare to negotiate on
the basis of skill, not on the basis of international justice. When the
ROC on Taiwan refused high seas boarding on the basis of the tradition of high seas jurisdiction, the United States claimed philosophically that "the right to agree to high seas boarding and inspection is
itself an exercise of sovereignty." The United States then threatened a
fishery boycott and obtained an agreement. International law of the
sea is only a tool of convenience for the powerful. The ROC on Taiwan should never have depended on it. The ROC was already on the
defensive because of the evidence against her poaching. To make matter worse, the ROC government negotiated passively with the United
States. The ROC's negotiation passivity and her dependence on international law frustrated her attempts for a more equitable agreement.
Despite the ROC's less than satisfactory performance in the fishery talks, the 1989 AIT-CCNAA fisheries negotiations provided important lessons to her future international dealings. Even when
negotiating with a strong opponent like the United States, the ROC
need not assume an automatic "no-win" situation. Although the fishery talks exposed many of the ROC's weaknesses in negotiating with
the United States, these weaknesses were also prevalent in her negotiations in general.
In the negotiations, the ROC failed to prepare thoroughly for the
negotiation. The lack of coordination among the government agencies
and the lack of communication with the domestic interests prevented
her from formulating a coherent strategy in the negotiations. Already
disadvantaged as a small nation, the ROC can not afford to negotiate
in disunity. For future negotiations, the ROC must first coordinate
her strategies among all domestic parties.
Furthermore, the ROC maintained lofty goals and failed to prioritize them. The the ROC government stressed its conviction to
stand by the non-high seas boarding principle. However, when the
United States refused to compromise on the issue, the ROC failed to
unlock the stalemate. To increase maneuverability in negotiation, the
ROC must attempt, before the negotiation, to identify, assess, and prioritize her objectives. The ROC should first set realistic goals and as-
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sess their importance. In addition, she should not publicize these
objectives early on, in case she fails to reach them and disappoints the
public. Finally, with prioritization, the ROC gives herself more flexibility in the negotiation, avoiding situations such as the sovereignty
stalemate.
Moreover, the ROC was a passive negotiator in the 1989 fishery
negotiation. Under the U.S. shadow, the ROC negotiators failed to
negotiate aggressively. The ROC is not yet an international power.
However, with her economic strength and increased global interdependence, the ROC could be more assertive. The ROC should take advantage of the increased global interest in global cooperation, ranging
from aid programs to conservation. The ROC should become more
active in negotiation efforts, establish her own agendas instead of following others, and initiate discussions rather than be forced into them.
The ROC essentially should avoid being on the defensive all the time.
Finally, the 1989 fishery negotiations illustrated the importance
the ROC placed on her sovereignty. The ROC's insecurity over her
diplomatic status has hindered her negotiation efforts. In order to
play a more active role in the international arena, the ROC needs to
overcome this insecurity. In a negotiation context, the ROC should
focus less on the de jure recognition issue. Instead, she should negotiate flexibly with her de facto strengths. With time, the world will have
to come to accept the ROC's strengths. Dogmatic adherence to de
jure sovereignty can only hinder the ROC's efforts in international
negotiations.
The ROC has survived four decades under the U.S. alliance.
With her increased wealth, the ROC has become more independent
and eager to venture into the global arena on her own. In Janurary
1990, the ROC officially forwarded her application to join GATT
under the name "Taiwan, Penghu, Kinman and Matsu Customs Territory."156 In 1989, the ROC established a $1.4 billion fund to aid third
world countries. 157 With her GATT application, the ROC had initially requested U.S. support for her entrance into the organization.
When the United States hesitated due to pressure from the People's
Republic of China, however, the ROC decided to go ahead with the
application under a flexible name anyway. 158 This incident illustrated
a change in the the ROC's foreign policy. The United States is still
156. Ku Bi-ling, "The First Move in the Ninety's,"Shih-pao chou- k'an, (China Times
Weekly) No. 255, January 13-19, 1990, pp. 56-51.
157. "The Other China is Starting to Soar," supra, note 134, p. 62.
158. Ran-liang, "We should let Taiwan Join GATT," Shih-pao chou-k'an (China Times
Weekly), No 255, January 13-19, p. 59.
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her most important ally, but ROC diplomacy has begun to emerge
from the U.S. shadow.
On a brighter note, the experience of the 1989 fishery talks has
already served as a foundation for future changes and refinements. In
March 1991, the ROC agreed to extend the fisheries accord for one
more year. However, this time, it did succeed in getting the United
States to agree to joint boarding and inspection, hence, reclaiming
some of the ROC's sovereign rights. Before this agreement expires in
June 1992, both countries will continue to discuss and monitor the
content of the agreement. The ROC may therefore have further opportunities to amend the present accord into a more cooperative one.
In order to succeed in new diplomatic initiatives, the ROC must
reorient her approaches to international negotiations. The 1989 Fisheries Negotiations demonstrates that the ROC still needs substantial
changes in her negotiations. In learning from her mistakes, the ROC
will surely achieve better results in future negotiations.
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Republic of China

South Korea

V~Sl!~l R~gUI!!IiQOft

1. Must be licensed
2. Limited entry
3. 10 must be displayed
4. List provided to the U.S.
5. Must report location

1. Must be licensed
2. Limited fleet size
3. ID must be displayed
4. List provided to the U.S.
5. Must report location

1. Must be licensed
2. limited to 160 vessels
3. ID must be displayed
4. List provided to the U.S.
5. Must report location

At-sea Transfer

Prohibited

1. Only by ROC vessels
carrying transmitters &
subject to inspection
2. Restricted and inspected
landings

1. Only by ROK vessels
carrying transmitters &
subject to inspection
2. Restricted and inspected
landings

00
0\

(')

0

~

t!1
~

"0

0

Fishina Records

Monthly effort & catch
reported by 6/30

Monthly effort & catch
reported in 6 months

Monthly effort & catch
reported in 6 months

Net Reaulations

Must be marked and can't
be discarded

Must be marked and can't
be discarded

Must be marked and can't
be discarded

B~!i~!!r!: h Cru I!i~

1. One U.S. & one
Canadian on one of two
Japanese small mesh
vessels
2. Report to INPFC
3. One U.S. on one
Japanese large mesh
vessel

none

none
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Courtesey of Alaska Department of Fjsh and Games. December 1989.
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